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Preface
H€l&ne Cixous' Conception of Scriture feminine:
The Risky Subversion and the Celebration of Diffdrance

Writing is the passageway, the entrance, the exit, the
dwelling place of the other in me— the other that I am and
am not, that I don't know how to be, but that I feel
passing, that makes me live— that tears me apart, disturbs
me, changes me, who?— a feminine one, a masculine one,
some?— several, some unknown, which is indeed what gives me
the desire to know and from which all life soars.
H616ne Cixous, "Sorties"

My projects arise from three different seminars:
Philosophy of Art, Philosophy of Law, and Philosophy of
Ecology.

As a student of philosophy and critical theory, I

have become drawn to the notion of the body and its cultural
constitution.

One cannot philosophize the body without

involving an inquiry into semiotics, and issues of gender,
class, race, and sexuality.

Being theoretically situated

within post-structural philosophies, and grounded in
feminist sensibility, I work from Kaja Silverman's
assumption that "the human subject is to a large degree the
subject of semiotics" (preface).

What Silverman suggests

here is the notion that signification (making meaning)
occurs within and through discourse, that any discourse
necessarily requires a subject, and that the subject itself

is an effect of discourses.

Silverman's emphasis on

psychoanalytic semiotics is critical because, as one of my
professors said, "The psychoanalytic framework at least
attempts to involve the body, whereas other philosophical
and critical discourses tend to leave the body in the hazy
realm of the sensual, or simply forget about it at all."
Within my theoretical discussions, I use a variety of
methodologies posed by different philosophers and
theoreticians in order to embrace the faculty of the body:
psychoanalytic semiotics, deconstruction, Marxist criticism,
psycho-linguistics, and feminist critique, to name the most
dwelt upon approaches.

I also assume the interconnections

between literary, cinematic, and theoretical texts to enable
a look at various cultural positions where our
constructedness via language happens.

In my endeavors of

writing about the body, I search for places of resistance to
challenge the patriarchal boundaries of Western metaphysics.
As Teresa de Lauretis points out in Alice Doesn't,
"Strategies of writing and of reading are forms of cultural
resistance" (7).
For me, Helene Cixous' subversive theoretical position,
whose philosophy I employ in most of my discussions, has
offered some places of textual resistance.

I want to devote

my introduction to a presentation of Cixous' theoretical
grounds in order to present a reader with the premises of my
own readings.

Attempting to dispute gendered, hierarchical and linear
discourse appraised in Western culture, Hdl^ne Cixous in
"Sorties" draws on Jacques Derrida's critique of the
logocentric constitution of Western thinking, and on his
contention of language which through both difference and
deferral always occupies the space of diffdrance *.

Cixous'

theoretical project aims at undermining the patriarchal
sexual, social, and linguistic order operating on abstract
truths, sharp dichotomic divisions, and reducing all
categories to its own fixed terms.

She attempts to subvert

the logocentric ideology and to dismantle phallogocentrism.
Her concept of ecriture feminine opposes the idea that
meaning is fully present in language, and resists the
supremacy of the phallus as the transcendental signifier.
In order to disrupt traditional phallogocentric
discourse and to claim ecriture feminine in cultural terms,
Cixous engages the concept of bisexuality.

Her idea of

bisexuality embraces the notion of the subject which
recognizes otherness in itself, and "permits" the
possibility of a mergence of all kinds of "I's."

She calls

bisexuality "the location within oneself of the presence of
both sexes," and describes it as the unfixed space of
differance, the sphere of fluidity, mobility, inviting and
accepting the other in oneself (148).

Such a view of

bisexuality not only undermines the traditional category of

closure in women, men, language, and writing, but also
celebrates the inclusion of difference.
In her statement "It is only in this condition [of
bisexuality] that we invent," Cixous links philosophic or
poetic creativity with the mobility of the self, with the
inventing subject's desire to open its horizons of vision by
embracing the other, and by giving it its own voice (147).
Creativity then rests on the rejection of the repression of
the "selves one didn't know" (147).

Cixous argues that

woman is bisexual because historically she already occupies
the sphere of differance where the subject accepts its
occupation by the other and permits it to speak. Unlike man
who fears and rejects femininity within himself and
cherishes his oneness, woman lives through difference.
Culturally defined masculinity has to repress and deny
the feminine in order to enjoy the primacy of the phallus.
Man does not need the other to be a masculine subject; in
his encouraged monosexuality he can stand alone and claim
himself as a harmonious self.

In fact, through its

disruption and dismemberment of the monoglossic unity,
bisexuality poses itself as a serious threat to masculinity.
For Cixous, woman is a category produced and subsumed
by the masculine discourse; she is a metaphor in writing.
Her provocative statement that "Writing is woman's" suggests
that writing occupies the space of differance, and therefore
displaces the rigid division between "masculine" and
v

"feminine" visions.

Writing, understood in cultural terms,

always disturbs the binary opposition of Woman/Man, and
produces the realm of ambiguity.

Since a woman is already

speaking within the symbolic system which excludes her and
situates her on the margins, she always writes from the
place of ambivalence.

Having no definition and no

boundaries, woman travels through the unexplored and
undefined space of both presence and absence.

She is

present because she "writes," but since there is no place
for her in language, she functions as absence, both being
emerged in the Symbolic Order and trying to move beyond it.
Cixous suggests that writing from the space of
differance can be liberating, but that it also poses the
danger of losing oneself, of transgressing the fixed limits
of one's own subjectivity.

Although she acknowledges that

the linear masculine logic has erected rigid boundaries
which differentiate by exclusion, Ecriture feminine is not
prescribed exclusively to women.

However, men, taught to

resist the feminine, are less likely to free themselves from
the phallic dominance and move beyond the authoritative
discourse.

Also, since men occupy language and claim it as

their own property, they are less prone to attempt to
subvert it.
To show how ecriture feminine can subvert the law of
language, Cixous invokes the concept of "voler," i.e.
"flying" and "stealing" at the same time.

Ecriture feminine

does not appropriate the masculine power, but steals
language and captures its structure only to make it fly, to
shift its stable paradigm.

This theft of the available

resources suggests the possibility of shifting and
relocating the fixed meaning in the realm of the symbolic
order.
Cixous' own way of writing shows how "stealing" and
"flying" work.

She problematizes the question of style by

displaying how content and form (and body and mind) exist
and work together in fusion and cannot be separated.

By

writing a theoretical piece in a passionate, highly visual,
and poetic way, she risks the accusation of being
"emotional" and not "rational."
goal:

But this is precisely her

she wants to demonstrate how writing lingers in the

space of differance, and how mind and body operate together.
Being passionate and sensual does not have to signify
irrationality.

In fact, ecriture feminine aims at winning

back our bodies and bringing them back to writing our
visions.
Cixous claims that the power of the symbolic order has
driven women away from their bodies.

In the tradition of a

male-oriented institution, Woman implies silence and
subordination to the male centrality sustained by
philosophy, art, and language.

Phallocentrism has led women

into self-distrust and self-rejection.

To move beyond

masculine discourse and "steal" and "fly," women need to
v ii

uproot themselves from the ideological supremacy of the male
center and its binary reasoning.

v iii

Notes

1.

By attacking the monolithic, logocentric tradition

of meaning making, Derrida problematizes the concept of
truth.

His project does not strive to redefine words, but

points to their inevitably problematic structure.

His

analysis of "differance" as a concept carrying double
significance of both difference and deferral shows that
meaning can never be fully formed and fully present.
Signification is produced through a series of differences
and is always temporally deferred.

Each time we speak or

write, the significance or meaning is "promised" and then
deferred, so we can never "catch," stabilize or define
meaning.

For that reason, Derrida does not want to classify

differance as a concept since it would presume a static,
identifiable and

singular definition.

Meaning in language

always depends on differance and remains in constant
movement, in a "play" with other words, in a process of
appearing and disappearing.

The breakdown of "differance"

points to the fact that there not only is a double meaning
in words,

but also that each word contains the power to

deconstruct itself through the embodiment of the opposite
meaning.

In other words, the "other" is always present to

the word;

the word itself becomes absent from its own

center.

We attempt to communicate meaning through language,

but language itself does not offer a clear space where we

can proclaim the ultimate significance.

Being aware that

language always defers and that there is no fixed meaning
(and therefore no stable significance), we can only play off
the tension and the promise that is produced every time we
engage ourselves in linguistic discourse.

x
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Writing the Body:
Susan Griffin's Eco-Feminist
Project as a Critical Deconstruction of a Male
Center and a Revision of Female Voices
We know ourselves to be made from this
earth. We know this earth is made
from our bodies.
Susan Griffin, Woman and Nature
Yet, "we-women" have never been the heroes of
philosophy.
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak,
"Displacement and the Discourse of Woman"
...you can't talk about a female sexuality,
uniform, homogenous, classifiable into codes...
Woman's imaginary is inexhaustible, like music,
painting, writing: their stream of phantasms
is incredible. More so than men coaxed toward
social success, toward sublimation, women are
body (emphasis mine).
Helene Cixous, "The Laugh of the Medusa"
Within the patriarchal realm of Western capitalism and
consumerism that constantly moves us toward more complex
industrial and urban spaces, the so-called "natural"
environment continues to be devalued and devastated.

For

the past twenty years feminist scholars and activists have
argued for the need to combine environmental efforts with
the feminist sensibility.

Because the grounds of the

traditional environmental endeavors rest on the patriarchal
models of domination, women's movements need to embrace the
issues of environmental ethics and pierce through the
dominant ideological structures that continue to oppress
1

both women and nature.

The theory and praxis of ecofeminism

(ecological feminism) have emerged out of the strong
conviction that the environment is a feminist issue.

My

project, working from Susan Griffin's book Woman and Nature,
attempts to provide a terrain for re-thinking the way in
which a feminist critic, informed by an ecofeminist agenda,
can write and perform outside the binary oppositions of
mind/body that have kept both women and nature under the
power dynamics of patriarchy.

My discussion, then, will

necessarily involve an inquiry into the legacy of Western
metaphysics, the construction of language, and the position
of a female subject who attempts to write her body.
In order to address Woman and Nature effectively, first
I want to present the theoretical grounds of ecofeminism
that can be treated as a framework for Griffin's literary
project.

In her introduction to the section on

"Ecofeminism" in the anthology, Environmental Philosophy, a
feminist philosopher, Karen Warren, explains the foundation
of the ecofeminist movement:

"Many feminists have argued

that the goals of these two movements are mutually
reinforcing; ultimately they involve the development of
worldviews and practices that are not based on male-biased
models of domination" (253).

It is important to stress that

there is no homogenous vision of ecofeminist sensibility; as
Warren says, "What one takes to be a genuine ecofeminist
position will depend largely on how one conceptualizes both

feminism and ecofeminism" (254).

The area of ecofeminism

embraces feminism, environmentalism, environmental
philosophy, and philosophy in general, and it concerns
itself with uncovering and breaking down the conceptual
patriarchal paradigms of power that perpetuated the
domination of women and nature.

Ultimately, ecofeminism

asks us to rethink the traditional notions of the self,
rationality, moral and ethical values, and our understanding
of the knower and the known.

Generally, feminists who

operate within this theoretical (and practical) sphere work
from the premise that the patriarchal mind has historically
devalued both nature and women and used them as a resource.
Ecofeminism, then, challenges the realm of philosophy itself
and aims "to replace conceptual schemes, theories, and
practices that currently feminize nature and naturalize
women to the mutual detriment of both with ones that do not"
(Warren 265).

The problem of "feminizing nature and

naturalizing women" originates out of the mind/body
dichotomy that has been perpetuated by the discourse of
traditional philosophy.
H61ene Cixous in her passionate manifesto, "The Laugh
of the Medusa," addresses the possibility of collapsing the
mind/body dichotomy within language.

I believe that Cixous'

provocative statement "women are body," which I use for the
motto of my discussion, attempts to respond to the tradition
of Western metaphysics and its phallogocentric grounds which
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continue to influence the cultural discourse of philosophy,
critical theory, and linguistic studies (343).
Historically, this legacy has not only produced a mind/body
split, but it has also privileged the subjectivity of the
white male intellectual who claims the central place in
philosophical polemics about the ontological,
epistemological, ethical, and aesthetic stipulations of
human experience.

Within this dichotomy, philosophy itself

is associated with the power of reason which traditionally
belongs to the male subject.

Women, on the other hand, are

identified with the body, both literally (through their
reproductive abilities, for example) and philosophically,
placing them outside the intellectual realm of reasoning and
critical thinking.
Traditional logic links women and the body, devaluating
both the critical agency of women and the status of the body
itself.

Although it may seem that Cixous, by emphasizing

the body, only asserts the position already prescribed to
women, I want to suggest that her contention that "women are
body" aims at disrupting this inherited logic of either/or
exclusionary oppositions, forcing us to move into a more
dialectical way of thinking that embraces both/and
sensibility.

I see Cixous performing a double move in the

attempt to claim a space of critical agency for a female
subject.

Rather then denying the faculty of the body, and

perpetuating the exclusionary dichotomy of Western
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metaphysics, Cixous tries to collapse the binary oppositions
of mind/body and to claim that both the body and mind exist
and operate in a dialectical relationship.

By reclaiming

the rights of the body to be philosophical and the rights of
the mind to be sensual, Cixous provides us with a subversive
paradigm with which we can intervene in a traditional
philosophical discourse.

Through philosophizing the body

and sensualizing the mind, she opens up a space for an
inclusionary way of thinking.
I believe that this terrain of inclusionary, rather
than exclusionary, visions that Cixous posits and her
attempt to philosophize the body is exercised by Griffin in
Woman and Nature.

Griffin's project, acknowledging that

environmental issues are feminist concerns, is rooted within
an ecofeminist sensibility.
into four books.

Woman and Nature is divided

The first two books, "Matter" and

"Separation," form, what I call, the project of
deconstruction.
vision:

The last two books, "Passage" and "Her

Now She Sees Through Her Own Eyes," develop the

project of construction.

The project of deconstruction

traces the history of patriarchy's sensibility and its
resolutions about bodily matters.

In her introduction,

Griffin describes the premise of her project as follows:
I begin the book by tracing a history of
patriarchy's judgement about the nature of matter,
or the nature of nature, and place these
judgements side by side, chronologically, with
men's opinions about the nature of women

throughout history. From this philosophical
beginning the book becomes more actual, treating
of the effect of patriarchal logic on material
beings. And so the first book, "Matter,"
continues the analogy drawn between woman and
nature into explorations of the earth, trees,
cows, show horses and women's bodies as we all
exist in patriarchy, (xvi)
The book on "Separation" begins with the image of woman's
body isolated from her womb, her desire and her
spirituality:
Her womb from her body. Separation. Her clitoris
from her vulva. Cleaving. Desire from her body.
We were told that bodies rising to heaven lose
their vulvas, their ovaries, wombs, that her body
in resurrection becomes a male body.(95)
This section reveals the splits that patriarchy requires us
to make:

body from soul, intellect from passion, nature

from culture, to name a few.

within her deconstructionist

endeavor, Griffin attacks the phallogocentric core of
Western scholarship and reveals its deep-rooted phobia of
woman and nature.

By mapping the terrain of western

patriarchy and tracing its voice throughout 2,500 years of
Anglo-European history, Griffin disturbs the foundation of
male-oriented tradition.

She discloses and critiques the

premises of Western patriarchal metaphysics, epistemology,
and the weight of its moral, religious and aesthetic values.
Her project tries to show how the oppressive patriarchal
conceptual framework, operating through a hierarchical logic
of domination, has come to control both women and nature,
and subsequently subsumed them into a masculine discourse.
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The constructionist project, which starts with the
third book called "Passage," marks the liberating journey of
female subjectivity away from the oppressive patriarchal
norms.

The last book, "Her Vision," re-conceives the

patriarchal vision of the earth, and women's experience on
it:

"The book is not so much utopian as a description of a

different way of seeing" (Griffin xvi).

Trying to unveil

woman's presence and consciousness as separate from the
patriarchal sensibility, and to reconstruct female voices,
Griffin first identifies the oppressors in order to break
down the patriarchal voice.

The intensifying female voices

challenge epistemological separations of body from soul,
mind from emotion, which patriarchal consciousness requires
women to make.

Speaking through the body, both literally

and metaphorically, these voices resist the subordination of
body to mind, and refute the denotation of writing as a
strictly mental endeavor.

The "great chorus of woman and

nature" (xvii) offers new ways of seeing and asserts that
women's bodies can influence women's language and visions.
Woman and Nature, then, proposes at first a
deconstructionist step as a necessary phase to undo the
dominant paradigms in order to provide us with a liberating,
constructionist vision where women may begin reclaiming
their bodies and finding an active space for their agency.
In order to explain the philosophical grounds of
Griffin's deconstruction, I want for a moment to continue
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the discussion of the workings of Western metaphysics and to
present some feminist positions that are aimed at re-working
it.

Western philosophical thought has been dominated by the

metaphysical logic of binary oppositions that operates on
persistent juxtaposition of Matter and Soul, Presence and
Absence, Being and Nothingness, Same and Other, Nature and
Culture.

Consequently, these oppositions allow for a

hierarchy that esteems a "positive" side, and subdues its
"negative" counterpart.

As a result, the terms Masculine/

Feminine have also been subjugated to gendered, dichotomous
oppositions, prescribing to women and men specific positions
in society and in the history of civilization.
First, theoretically submissive to the concept of
masculinity, woman emerges as a subordinate construct.

She

is man's antithesis, his other, the negative of the
positive.

These dichotomies have dominated Western

discourse and have become a vehicle of meaning for
understanding human experience.

This dualistic mindset

clearly has excluded women from the legitimate creation of
any discourse:
literary.

historical, philosophical, artistic or

Women have been made conspicuously absent in the

origination of speech and language.

Cixous, for example,

suggests that in order for a female subject to claim a space
of agency within the cultural discourse she must construct
her revolution within the linguistic realm, not outside it:
"I-woman am going to blow up the Law:

an explosion
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henceforth possible and ineluctable; let it be done, right
now, in language" (343).

The concept of "blowing up the

\

Law" suggests the possible resistance to the law of the
Symbolic Order (i.e. language and its institutions) and its
cultural coercion.

By stressing that the defiance must take

place in language, Cixous asserts the notion that our
subjectivities are not only constructed through and within
language, but also that we are never outside language and
its workings.

In other words, we cannot think about a

radical social change and a transformation of philosophical
paradigms without scrutinizing our positions within the
cultural place of language:

"Writing is precisely the very

possibility of change, the space that can serve as a
springboard for subversive thought, the precursory movement
of a transformation of social and cultural structures"
(Cixous 337).
Current feminist scholars have already started
exploring the possibilities of working from and against the
authoritarian institutions of language that have been
stifling women and their critical agency.

Shoshana Felman,

for example, in her article, "Women and Madness:

The

Critical Phallacy," analyzes female absence in language by
looking at the loss of woman's identity in an overwhelmingly
patriarchal culture.

Attempting to decode cultural terms of

gender and power, Felman genders Jacques Derrida's critical
deconstruction of Western metaphysics.

According to

10

Derrida, all Western discourse is built on the principle of
"logocentrism," the domineering presence of a logos.

This

Logos— being God, Reason, or Truth— affirms the privileged
status of a center through a hierarchical subordination of
all the "opposite” qualities. 1 Although Felman accepts the
notion of a center, her argument goes beyond Derrida's
construct.

Focusing on a notion of presence and absence in

language, she identifies the center as an overtly masculine
construct, revealing its male identity, its "male self
presence and consciousness-to-itself" (8).

Since the

language of Western culture has been male-centered and has
come to explain the world through hierarchical polarities,
subsequently, Male, Mind, Culture, Spirit and Light have
come to subjugate Female, Body, Nature, Matter and Darkness.
Identified through a patriarchal context, woman remains
deprived of a place in literary discourse.

How then, does a

woman writer create in a culture that has been originated,
authored, and perpetuated by men?
In their essay "Infection in the Sentence," Sandra
Gilbert and Susan Gubar engage this question in an attempt
to find ways in which a woman author fits into the
essentially male-centered literary history.

Reduced to a

marginal voice, a female writer does not "fit in;" whenever
she picks up a pen "she seems to be anomalous, indefinable,
alienated, a freakish outsider" (291).

Thus, female writing

emerges as both a revolt against patriarchal literary
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authorship and a struggle to reclaim feminine identity.
Rebelling against this masculine uniformity, Griffin's Woman
and Nature not only marks and dismantles the oppressive
patriarchal voice, but also creates a fresh voice, or rather
an orchestration of female voices to deconstruct the
statement that woman is one, same, and easily definable:
So we say, finally, we know what happens in this
darkness, what happens to us while we sleep, if we
allow the night, if we allow what she is in the
darkness to be, this knowledge, this that we have
not yet named: what we are. (168)
Woman and Nature is conceived in an experimental style that
mixes poetry and prose, and speaks in the compelling voices
of women, animals, and land that ultimately subvert and
empty out the patriarchal center.

Using Cixous' concept, I

want to suggest that Griffin is "blowing up the Law" by
resisting the patriarchal model of reasoning and by creating
a new vision of philosophical discourse within language.
Revolting against the male-centered order and power,
Griffin proposes original ways of rethinking philosophical
language and gives voice to those who have been denied
identity and kept voiceless.

The very place of her writing

unsettles traditional masculine discourse.

By undoing the

institutionalized boundary between poetry and prose, and
between the literary text and theory, Griffin demasculinizes
the space of writing.

Within her text, she creates a

dialogized space to embrace both the patriarchal voice and
the multiple voices of women who speak against this unified
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space.

Unlike the patriarchal narrative which constructs

itself as dispassionate and rational, women's voices are
embodied, impassioned, and situated within the physicality
of their bodies and the materiality of the land.
The multiple voices of women and animals that Griffin
brings to presence not only interrupt the patriarchal voice,
but also create, to use Mikhail Bakhtin's terminology, 2 a
heteroglossic discourse.

I think that Griffin experiments

with heteroglossia to show how the patriarchal voice, which
pretends to operate on uniformity and sameness, can be
challenged and fragmented through women's and nature's
multiple visions, through their difference.

Historically,

women's difference had to be suppressed in order to ensure
the homogeneity of the patriarchal discourse.

Griffin's use

of a heteroglossic address shows how women's otherness
unsettles and disturbs the sameness dictated by systems of
male authority, and disrupts the power of the dominant
narrative.
Griffin's text also rethinks traditional philosophical
argumentation, which, like the patriarchal voice she is
tracking, poses itself as systematic, linear, logical, and
rational.

The faculty of the rational, which necessarily

excludes the emotional, the bodily, and the sensual, has
become the embodiment of the logic of domination.

Within

this dominant paradigm, any discourse that does not fall
into the established category of the rational is rendered as
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irrational and stigmatized as invalid.

Ordering its logic

through binary antagonisms, the patriarchal rationale makes
no personal or experiential claims, denies the validity of
individual experience, and in an inexorable, objective, and
passive utterance, declares itself an omniscient judgement
and the only true voice of humanity.

The sensibility of

patriarchal thought rests on statements like "...It is
decided...It is said...It is stated...It is observed...,"
and exemplifies the oppressive nature of an "authoritative
discourse" (Bakhtin's term).

"Authoritative discourse" (or

monoglossia) presents itself as the privileged language of
hegemony which is undialogized, transcendent, and bodiless.
The patriarchal voice, which establishes the dominant
narratives of Western culture, claims the domain of
philosophy itself; the constructedness of the philosophical
sphere is posited as the sublime experience irrevocably
connected with the faculty of the mind.

The concept of the

body, on the other hand, is a denigrated periphery which is
always spoken for.

Moreover, the refined space of

philosophy is claimed to be the place of Truth which
pretends to be singular, absolute and unchangeable.
Consequently, the space of speaking (and critical thinking)
is traditionally masculine.

The male literary tradition,

established and fed by the authoritative, monoglossic voice,
absents female word, presence, significance and desire.
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I believe that Griffin goes into the unsettling
research of reconstructing the patriarchal voice present in
philosophy and literature to express the problem of address
that this voice poses.

Patriarchy has not only

unobtrusively and consistently universalized and
essentialized women, but it has also created a female
ghostly subject:

instead of speaking for themselves, women

have been repeatedly spoken for and about.

In a similar

fashion, the faculty of the body, also universalized,
strictly gendered, and categorized, has appeared only in the
form of a ghostly presence.

The phallocentric discourse,

then, claiming the site of a transcendent truth, is built on
the idea of a double deprivileging:

the depreciation of the

body and the dis-placement of woman (Spivak's term 3).

In

other words, the masculine discourse constructs itself on
the premise of women's absence and on the grounds that the
mind governs the body.

Both the female subject and the

faculty of the body have been denied the position of
knowers, and instead have always functioned as objects of
knowing.

The displacement of women as autonomous subjects

has sustained the pretended singularity of the male story.
Griffin suggests that through reading and unfolding the
patriarchal narrative we can read a female ghostly presence
and the "hidden" intertextuality of the patriarchal
voices 4.

By putting together numerous enunciations of male

philosophers, Griffin questions the stability of the
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patriarchal subject, and reveals how, contrary to its
intentions, patriarchy does not speak in a coherent and
unified voice.
Tracing the legacy of Western patriarchy, Griffin's
text directly talks back to the biblical teachings, to the
texts of Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Darwin, Freud, Marx,
Pavlov, and to many other male disputants of human reality,
knowledge, morality, and sexuality.

Western metaphysics not

only sets a spirit-matter distinction that results in a
mind-body dualism, but also decides that "the nature of a
woman is passive, that she is a vessel waiting to be filled"
(5).

Man, associated with God and Reason, claims the soul,

eternity, and lightness.

God is a mathematician, and

consequently, all Truth can be found in mathematics and
logical reasoning.
commands matter:

Science dominates nature like the spirit
"[T]he demon resides in the earth, it is

decided, in Hell, under our feet" (7).

The patriarchal

dogma decides that woman is closer to the earth, and
therefore remains demonic and hellish, signifying material
flesh and lust:

"the devil's agent" (9).

Despite being

categorized as a witch, a woman is also paradoxically
labeled as child-like, defective, frail, of impotent body
and mind, and intellectually incapable of embracing
spiritual essence.

A woman, born of man and named by him,

will always remain a secondary creation blamed for sin,
corruption, and loss of innocence.

The only redemption for
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her inadequacy and monstrosity derives its power from the
capacity to multiply the race of strong and omnipotent
males.

She has to stay in the domestic sphere, away from

public life.

Male virility, semen, and phallus, unify the

power of the perfect being, potency, and knowledge:

"It is

decided that the ovum is passive and the sperm is
adventurous" (29).

Hence, men, being the legitimate agents

who sustain civilization, have the right, and even
obligation, to direct woman and nature:

" A woman should be

an enthusiastic slave to the man to whom she has given her
heart, it is declared" (32).
Uncovering the misogynistic core of the male center,
Griffin confronts and re-evaluates Christian thought which
has assisted in reinforcing hierarchical dualisms.

She

strips this religion of its spiritual and ideological
facade, identifying it as a male-oriented faith.

The Judeo-

Christian canon has pushed women to the margin, not only
placing guilt on them but also manipulating their
consciousnesses to the point that they are forbidden to
claim themselves:
Yes, they argued, considering only justice, the
life of the unborn should be sacrificed to save
the life of the mother. Yes, they exclaimed, they
are not opposed to natural beauty. But does not
charity ask that the mother prefer the life of her
unborn infant over her own life? they asked.
(118-119)
We were urged to weigh the mother's life against
the life of her unborn. We were urged to weigh
our lives against the lives of our children. (119)
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The Church, which through its biblical word assigned
divinity to men, authorizes the condemnation of woman and
nature.

The Fall, caused by Eve's lascivious alliance with

the Devil, removes from the earth its sublime bliss:
originates mutability, decay, and death.

The earth becomes

the seat of sin, a vessel of darkness and bodily desire,
ultimately subservient to the Divine Light.

Nature is only

ignorant matter with no vision, erudition, intelligence, or
ability to comprehend itself.

In a parallel way, woman's

body carries carnal passion, deceit, and a mark of death:
"all sin originated in the flesh of the body of a woman and
lives in her body" (11).

The Church, claiming to carry a

torch of light and salvation, wages a war against womenwitches who, in the dark wilderness of nature, make a pact
with the devil:

"all witchcraft comes from carnal lust

which is in women insatiable" (11).

After women become

objects of scrutiny, persecution, investigation, and
torture, they are objectified, tormented, dehumanized, and
burned.

By first ascribing to women the power of black

magic and then attempting to exterminate them, the
patriarchal voice not only admits its fear of women but also
asserts their power.

Her menstrual blood, her bodily

fluids, her corporeality, her womb, her nature are dangerous
and threatening to the masculine sensibility.

Either she

will be consumed in flames or she will learn to fear her own
nature, deny her sexuality, and become socialized as a
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compliant and mute counterpart of man.

After all, "a

virtuous wife is one who obeys her husband, as the Church
obeys Christ" (10).
Above all, however, patriarchal discourse professes
female sexuality as subaltern and deficient:
said that girls are born castrated.

"And it is

And it is said that

small girls develop an envy of the penis and that women bear
a natural hostility toward men, a jealousy" (44).

She is

declared to be passive and born nonresistant:
We are the empty vessel, the background, the body.
We were told that since it is in our nature to be
needed, that his need is our need, and that his
happiness is our happiness in all things. And if
we should suffer at his hands we must have wished
for this suffering, that his sins are our sins,
that without him, we are not. (102)
As a little girl, a woman suffers the discovery of a lack of
penis which results first in self-abasement, later in a
hatred of her mother, and ultimately in a scorn of all
womanhood.

Suffering from penis-envy, a woman with "the

atrophied penis, a girl's clitoris" is lack, incompleteness,
and jealousy, surrendering to the phallus:

the only

sexuality in which human worth and power reside (88).
Secretly, she desires to be hurt, raped, and consumed since
her destiny is pain:

"the grown woman wishes to be

pierced," and "the ovum...is primordially masochistic" (45).
And, like women, the earth is pronounced as passive, ready
to be discovered, conquered, altered, named and possessed.
Animals are waiting to be tamed, trained, and hunted:

"He
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breaks the wilderness.

He clears the land of trees, brush,

weed. The land is brought under his control" (52).
Unraveling the perverted logic of patriarchy in all of
its manifestations, Griffin shows how phallogocentric,
analytical and deductive reasoning rationalizes women's
exploitation, abuse, rape, female circumcisions,
hysterectomies, and breast surgeries.

She aptly illustrates

how nature is invaded, technologized, radiated and polluted;
how women's bodies and land, being just the instruments and
vehicles for affirmation of male ownership and power, serve
as vessels to perpetuate the history of male creation:
He has pierced the veiling mountains, ridden the
rivers, spanned the valley, measured the gorge:
he has discovered. Now nothing of this place is
unknown, and because of his knowledge, this land
is forever changed. (48)
We have not learned the name for clitoris. We do
not know what to call our vulvas. We have never
seen our own vulvas. We know nothing about our
wombs. These belong to men, we learn, only the
men touch them, only the men seize them, name
them, only the men have seen them. These are not
part of us. (91)
Griffin reveals how both women and animals are
conceptualized as objects rather than autonomous subjects,
while men are viewed as conquerors, name-givers,
penetrators, and possessors.

She discloses the ways in

which the fertility of women and nature is manipulated and
controlled, and men are made capable of and responsible for
"measuring" life:
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He counts the number of children being born. He
measures the growth of food. He calculates the
sum. He says that through quantities we find
ultimate reality. (12 6)
The multiplicity of female voices that Griffin brings to
presence talk back to the patriarchal discourse which
dictates the separation of thought and feeling, the
categorization of human significance, and which drives the
search for the objective, universal Truth.
Bringing silence to language, by drawing upon women's
unheard voices, Woman and Nature also questions and rethinks
the aesthetic values of the patriarchal mind.

Griffin,

critical about these values, reworks their significance and
reveals the reality of different aesthetics for women.
Western art paints both women and land as territories
submissive to the male gaze. 5 The standard of beauty, when
applied to women, is bound to be competitive and aimed at
the pleasure of the male voyeur.

Classical paintings

celebrate male voyeurism by displaying women as beautiful
yet passionless aesthetic objects:

sexually obtainable,

always available, silent, aware that the male spectator is
judging their value.

In the eyes of male authors, who use

images of women as instrumental mediums, womankind is always
looking for the assertion of her identity in male adoration.
In the tradition of Western art, woman's "to-be-looked-atness" (Mulvey's term 6) grants man the visual pleasure and
the power of the look.

The way she appears to others is the

source of success and validity of her life.

HEAD OF A
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WOMAN, SEATED NUDE, THE MODEL, STANDING NUDE WITH RAISED
ARMS, RECLINING WOMAN, NUDE WOMAN, WOMAN WITH FAN, WOMAN AND
BIRD CAGE BY WINDOW are only a few of Griffin's
illustrations of women being the equivalent of objectified
flesh, always as articles of male desire, trapped by the eye
of the beholder-owner:
We testify that we were called woman. We were
called woman and we were called nature and we were
the objects of his art.(9$)
This art, which has bequeathed to us abundant images of nude
women-objects and dressed men-owners, constitutes the
artistic history of male creation.
is another garment woman wears.

Displayed female nudity

She is not a sexual, active

participant; her passion is repressed and subjugated.
Woman's body not only belongs to her husband-possessor but
is also converted into flesh and refused any sensibility:
"[S]he is the flesh, and he is the head" (100).

In the

legacy of male aesthetics, WOMAN has become a rational
category of virginity, wifery, motherhood, or prostitution
subject to being taken, owned or given to:
the body of the husband" (100).

"she is part of

She has become everything

but an active and independent agent.

She has been

prescribed numerous identities as her definitions:
we were called Lady Brett Ashley, we were called
The False Duessa, harlot, heifer, mare and the
nagging wife of Rip Van Winkle...we were called
quail, slattern and Lady Macbeth...we were called
shrew, we were called sow, we were called vixen...
(99)
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Throughout the tradition of male creation, WOMAN emerges as
a patriarchal construct with no history, no culture, no
politics she can call her own.

The validity of her being

has been defined through the construct of masculinity and
through its obsessions and aspirations for prestige,
glamour, and ownership.
The patriarchal mind gives no space for woman's needs,
desire, or passion.

Western art plays on passion, but the

generated desire never belongs to a woman; she is
consistently the desired one, not being permitted to desire
herself.

The spectator-owner has the monopoly on passion,

and paradoxically, a portrayed woman is denied the right to
be sexual.

John Berger's film, Ways of Seeing, engaged in a

similar project of verifying Western art through the
exploration of visual language, grasps the underlying
messages of portraying women as objectified, packaged, and
consumed images.

His distinction between nakedness and

nudity captures the contrast between being oneself and being
seen naked by others, yet not being recognized for
oneself. 7

Similarly, Griffin recognizes the male gaze as

self-serving, aimed at the pleasure of the male spectator.
Nude, dismembered, and displayed bodies, overtly saying that
"the meaning of woman is to be meaningless," (100) carry
bitter testimony of women's pain, humiliation, and absence.
Torn by the contradictions of patriarchy that ask women
to be at once untouched yet attractive and luring, passive
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yet seductive, erotic yet motherly, women are placed in the
labyrinth of male manipulation.

This labyrinth positions

women against other women, asks them to stay immature and
dependent, teaches them to fear their own body, schools them
in beautifying techniques, warns them not to get old, forces
them to keep themselves at a distance from other women, and
traps them in a circle of confusion:
The room in which the women fear time. In which
she is afraid of becoming her mother. This
labyrinth. The room in which women praise their
clothing and sigh that they are no longer
children. The room in which time is a mirror.
The labyrinth in which the women fear aging. (156)
Without a doubt in Western culture women fear aging.

The

natural process of changing and growing older has been
devalued and rendered one of the major sources of women's
anxiety.

Women are taught to aspire to achieve, what this

culture labels as, "ideal female beauty," through a
perpetual struggle to alter and disguise their bodies.

They

are manipulated into losing contact with their bodies.
Within the patriarchal culture of consumerism, plastic
surgeries, cosmetics, and special diets acquire a magical
power offering success, love, and fulfillment.

The media,

playing on women's fear of not being desirable, stimulate
them to purchase products instead of encouraging them to
make vital political decisions for themselves.

Images of

women entangled in this patriarchal labyrinth have also been
researched by Jean Killbourne in her video project Still
Killing Us Softly. 8 Killbourne links the objectification
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and fragmentation of*women's bodies in commercial culture
with the devaluing of feminine attributes, and most of all,
with sexual violence and abuse.
These propagated images of women have also been
reworked by French feminists Helene Cixous and Luce
Irigaray, both advocates of l'ecriture feminine, "feminine
writing," which aims at defying phallogocentric discourse.
They claim that the patriarchal sexual and social order,
which operates on abstract truths, sharp divisions, and
which reduces everything to its own fixed terms, can be
resisted and consequently subverted by the power of
jouissance. 9 Through the concept of jouissance, Cixous and
Irigaray pose the existence of a unique way of seeing,
experiencing, and writing, which disputes the gendered,
hierarchical, logical, and linear discourse privileged in
Western culture.

Wanting to bring the representations of

the body back to language, their discourse attempts to
resist the traditional inferiority of body to mind.
postulates:
(338).

"Write yourself.

Cixous

Your body must be heard"

She celebrates the female body and its faculty, and,

like Griffin, raises the issue of women's power and
significance that has been filtered through the primacy of
the phallus.

Cixous writes:

Men have committed the greatest crime against
women. Insidiously, violently, they have led them
to hate women, to be their own enemies, to
mobilize their immense strength against
themselves, to be the executants of their virile
needs. (336)
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Refusing to be entangled in the patriarchal labyrinth,
Cixous empties it out:

"[W]e the labyrinths, the ladders,

the trampled spaces, the bevies— we are black and we are
beautiful...Your continent is dark.
(336).

Dark is dangerous"

Irigaray, repudiating traditional concepts of

women's sexuality rationalized through masculine boundaries
of phallic singularity, moves even further to suggest that
woman is autoerotic.

Marked by labial lips in continuous

contact, "she is already two" (351) and, consequently, her
sexuality is not one and "lacking," but multiple:

"Her

sexuality, always at least double, goes even further:
plural" (353).

it is

Thus, the female imaginary, and female

pleasures and language are not singular, but like her
orgasm, they are multi-layered, multifaceted, and multi
dimensional.
Like Griffin, writing through a fusion of female
voices, Cixous also resists the uniformity of womanhood:
"[N]o general woman, no one typical woman..."(334).

Women

have been taught to keep themselves in the dark, to devalue
their passions and drives, to be swallowed by shame and
fear, to feel guilty.

Irigaray, using Marxist terminology,

examines this historical exploitation of women:
For woman is traditionally a use-value for man, an
exchange value among men; in other words, a
commodity. As such, she remains the guardian of
material substance, whose price will be
established, in terms of the standard of their
work and of their need/desire, by "subjects:"
workers, merchants, consumers, women are marked
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phallicly by their fathers, husbands, procurers.
And this branding determines their value in
sexual commerce. Woman is never anything but the
locus of a more or less competitive exchange
between two men, including the competition for the
possession of mother earth. (355)
Above all, however, women have been driven away from their
bodies.

In the tradition of male-oriented institutions,

WOMAN implies marginality.

She is placed in the realm

subordinate to male centrality, which has been sustained by
the workings of philosophy, art, and language.

"Parental-

conjugal phallocentrism" has led women into self-distrust
and self-rejection (Cixous 335).

To move beyond a

patriarchal narrative structure, women need to uproot
themselves from the constraints of the male center and its
binary reasoning.

Both Irigaray and Cixous suggest the

realm of sexuality and female bodies as a site for the reevaluation of women's positions.

The metaphor of "writing

from the body" can verify and shift realities in which women
live, and eventually open new contexts for female
discourses.

The radical socioeconomic change can come from

women themselves who will refuse categorization and
classification into male codes, and who will question their
prescribed identity by examining the history of their
oppression.
Griffin argues that patriarchal epistemology, obsessed
with numbering, measuring, categorizing, and naming, does
not negotiate an active space for female agency.

The

labyrinth entangles the female subject in renouncing her

needs, her fears, her sensuality.

It educates her in how to

hide her face by wearing a social mask of make-up.

Year by

year, she struggles with burying her intimate image, her
feelings, her passion.

The chapter, "The Room of The

Dressing," where "women lament the darkness of women," puts
continual demands on women to meet beauty standards
according to male criteria (156).

In this room, familiar to

all women, they cover their bodies, paint their faces, dress
their words, hide their secrets.

They desire to speak and

untangle the labyrinth, but they have no words:

"the

temptation to speak becomes large and the fear of speaking
larger" (156).

Engaged in a beauty contest, they never

touch, never feel each other's warmth, never trust each
other.

It is the room, "where the daughter denies she is

anything like her mother" (156).
Since all spheres of human discourse have been claimed
and subsumed by male power, even intimate acts like writing
are not her own:

"Maybe the language did not come to her,

she could not find the words.

Maybe what she felt got

turned in her mouth into other words" (111).

She lacks

words to describe her experience; she has no communal
language, no written history.

If she wants to be a

successful speaker or writer, she has to familiarize herself
with the male word and carry it on. 10
Griffin's radical construction project is left open,
stressing the belief that women are in the process of
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finding their identities and voices.

Unweaving the

patriarchal labyrinth, they are finding the space of agency.
This place of agency is necessarily complex in order to
challenge the monolithic construct of pleasure.

Women are

falling out of the oppression of the Dressing Room.

They

are slowly leaving this callous closure to enter a
liberating space where they can finally embrace their
bodies, passions, visions, and selves:
Where we uncover our bodies. Where we meet our
outcast selves... Where we go into darkness.
Where we embrace darkness. Where we lie close to
darkness, breathe when darkness breathes and find
darkness inside ourselves... Where we are not
afraid. Where joy is just under the surface.
Where we laugh. Where laughter fills us utterly
when we see what we thought was horrible. Where
our demands are endlessly received. Where
revelation fills us with glee. (157)
"The Room of the Undressing" is a symbolic place where
women re-think, re-claim, and re-possess their bodies,
language, and sexuality.

Dressed in female dreams and

wants, this new space ruptures and subverts the male order.
In Griffin's vision, the roaring inside women bursts and
unleashes their spirits.

The undressing room is the room

where "words are undressed," (157) and where women are no
longer vessels perpetuating men's names.

This re-claimed

labyrinth refutes the patriarchal argument by embracing
darkness and chaos as women's own:
have often disturbed the peace.
points to the future" (175).

"We are disorderly.

We

Indeed, we study chaos— it

This unveiled space, not

separated from matter, has no center, no ending:

"Space
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where, in her circling motion, she found an opening" (171).
This metaphoric opening is filled with the memory of female
mutilation, with anger that arrives roaring, with women's
presence that breaks open, questions, alters, and restores
the real beauty of women and land.

It is the space where

women declare their desires, re-make their time and collect
their power:
The time of her growing awareness. The days of
her bleeding. When she felt her body becomes
strong. The year when her anger gave her clarity
and all her weeping was filled with intelligence.
The morning of her full powers. The celebration
of her first gray hairs.The solemn recognition
of her coming age. (174)
In this new dimension filled with her private images, a
woman creates her own weaving, her own art.

WORKING WOMAN,

OLD WOMAN FROM A POORHOUSE, PORTIA WOUNDING HER THIGH,
BISONSFLEEING A

FIRE, WRAPPED IN SILENCE, LIFT EVERY VOICE

AND SING, COW'S SKULL WITH CALICO ROSES.

She paints her

pain, the river's pain, desert, wind, storm; she paints her
rights and her time.
rape, rage, isolation.

She paints the loss of her name, marks
She paints her body.

"The Anatomy

Lesson," in which a collage of voices speaks about body
awakening, suggests the opening of the revision.

If we are

dedicated to reclaiming our selves, our past and history, we
have to start with our bodies.

We have to learn how to

celebrate our bodies, how to take pleasure in our own locus.
Female bodies, scared, worn out and altered by birthing,
carry a testimony of women's lives:

"We know that it was in
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her body that we began.
body that we learn.

And now we say that it is from her

That we see our past" (209).

Griffin

visualizes woman's rebirth in a womb-like and earth-like
cave, in a close connection to water, mountains, wind, and
sand:
For we did not invent the blackbird, we say, we
only invented her name. And we never invented
ourselves, we admit... We know ourselves to be
made from this earth. We know this earth is made
from our bodies. For we see ourselves. And we
are nature. We are nature seeing nature. We are
nature with a concept of nature. (226)
Talking with voices of wind, waves, birds, and light, Woman
and Nature refuses to name and categorize woman and to call
nature.

The inseparable union between humans and nature

that Griffin suggests, acknowledges and honors the origins
of our being.
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Notes

1.

According to Jacques Derrida, Western metaphysics

has organized itself around the domineering presence of a
"central transcendental signified," or Logos.

This central

signified affirms the privileged status of a center through
hierarchical subordination of all the "opposite" qualities.
The word "transcendental" is crucial for an understanding of
this concept.

It suggests that this privileged signified—

God, Reason, Truth—

"transcends" the given signifying

system (language), that it is autonomous and independent of
the system in which it operates, and that it is capable of
going beyond it.

The central signified's transcendence also

suggests that this concept surpasses human experience and,
therefore, can claim its superiority.

Its centrality, on

the other hand, implies that the whole system relies on it
and is built around it.

The center becomes a point of

reference and presence that holds the Truth.

Examining this

organizing structure (also language) which builds itself
upon a center, Derrida points out the sliding of privileged
signifieds.

He claims the possibility of replacing one

privileged term by another, for example:

Monad (center of

Neo-Platonism)-> God (center of Christianity)->
consciousness (center of Romanticism).
Derrida's deconstructive project rests on the
assumption that "there was no center," i.e. that language is
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a system of differences with no "natural" or "universal"
terms that exist outside culture and can be claimed as
inherently and eternally "positive" or "singular."

Also,

Derrida's disclosure of a constructed center suggests the
opening of language and interpretation.

In other words, by

acknowledging that "there is no center," Derrida argues that
not only language is open to play, mutability, and limitless
signification, but also that "one," stable, absolute and
fixed meaning (like God, Monad or Logos) is an illusion.
Moreover, Derrida's "deconstruction" of these privileged
terms suggests that there are no "final" concepts that can
limit signification.

So, if there are no absolute

signifieds, then each signified can again function as a
signifier, making the process of signification a constant
play.

See Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass,

(Chicago:

University of Chicago Press, 1978).

2.

I am using here Mikhail Bakhtin's terminology

concerning the theory of language in The Dialogic
Imagination.

The term "heteroglossia," in other words

multivoicedness, is a discourse which undermines and
disrupts "authoritative discourse," or "monoglossia;" i.e. a
discourse that desires to hold to one voice.

Defying the

norms of systematic linguistics which tries to provide a
unified and orderly model of a language, the notion of
heteroglossia, permits a variety of discourses and suggests
that meaning in any utterance is contextual and positional.
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Bakhtin calls the discourse which uses heteroglossia,
"dialogism."

Dialogism rests on the assumption that there

is a constant interaction between meanings, all of which
have the potential of conditioning others. See The Dialogic
Imagination.
(Austin:
3.

Trans.

Caryl Emerson and Michael Holoquist.

University of Texas Press, 1981).
I am referring to Spivak's notion of "double

displacement"

which she explains in her article

"Displacement and the Discourse of Woman" (1983).

Spivak

renders the deconstructionist project problematic for a
feminist critic.

She argues that Derrida's critique of

phallogocentrism still privileges masculine agency.

Taking

woman as his model ("Woman will be my subject") and writing
about hymen, Derrida retains the concept of sexuality
defined from the point of view of a masculine thinker
(penetrator).

She further argues that historically woman

has been denied the position of a knower, and always
functioned as an object of knowing.

The metaphysical

tradition, explicating masculine desire, has always
displaced woman.

in Derrida's deconstructive reading of

that displacement, woman is displaced again because he
speaks from the point of view of a penetrator.
4.

According to the Dictionary of Literary Terms, the

notion of "intertextuality" was introduced by Julia Kristeva
to mark the interdependence of literary texts.

Kristeva

suggests that texts (philosophical, literary, etc.) are not
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isolated phenomena but rather that texts feed off one
another.

In other words, any signifying practice rests on

"transposition;" i.e. on interconnectedness of meanings in
various kinds of discourses.

With this contention, she

challenges the traditional notions of "originality" and
singularity of meaning.
5.

In Women and Film, Ann Kaplan discusses the male

gaze as a patriarchal concept which defines and dominates
women as erotic objects.

Relegating women to silence and

marginality, the male gaze carries social, political,
economic, and sexual power, which refuses female presence.
The sexualization and objectification of women in Hollywood
cinema is not only for the purpose of eroticism; it is
designated to invalidate the threat that women pose.
Accordingly, Hollywood productions, based on the idea of the
male gaze, repress the image of women as socially and
sexually conscious and active beings who are prepared to
negotiate their positions in society.
6. Laura Mulvey in her landmark essay on cinema,
"Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema," (1975) analyzes how
Hollywood films construct a "normative" heterosexual male
viewer and his gaze.

Mulvey suggests that the cinema lures

a viewer through scopophilia, the pleasure of looking.

For

a viewer, the act of looking itself, voyeurism, becomes the
source of gratification.

Freud, for example, identifying

scopophilia as one of the sexual instincts, understands it

35

as looking at others as objects and submitting them to a
dominant gaze.

Drawing on Freud, Mulvey suggests that, in

the traditional cinema, scopophilia implies the
objectification of women who function as sexual objects of
erotic spectacle.

The male spectator consumes the seductive

image of a woman, and woman's "to-be-looked-at-ness" grants
him the visual pleasure and the power of the look.
"Visual Pleasure and Narrative Cinema" in
Feminist Film Criticism.
(Bloomington:
7.

Ed.

See

Issues in

Patricia Erens.

Indiana University Press, 1990),

28-40.

Berger argues that in Western art nudity implies

submission and an awareness of being seen by the spectator.
A nude woman is often painted looking at herself in a
mirror, which is meant to symbolize female vanity.
Paradoxically, however, this image reveals the spectator's
vanity who considers himself the ultimate judge of female
beauty and perceives himself to be the source of woman's
satisfaction and self-respect.

Significantly, women are

painted without pubic hair since hair is associated with
threads of passion, energy, and sexuality.

Berger believes

that the importance of art and its aesthetic value
representing a sublime human experience has been shifted.
Paintings have become valuable objects to own, and if you
buy a painting, you also buy the look and prestige it
represents.

Accordingly, your identity and value are being

judged by what you possess.
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8.

Researching the influence of advertising as a

powerful force that influences us cumulatively and
unconsciously, Killbourne argues that regardless of their
age, women

are surrounded by messages telling them they are

inadequate

and unacceptable the way they are.

acceptable

and thus successful, women have to strive to

transform themselves.

To be

Advertising polarizes feminine and

masculine qualities through juxtaposing strong, invulnerable
men with sexually-willing, submissive women.

Above all,

however, women are trivialized and brutalized by being
turned into aesthetically pleasing objects that can be
obtained and eventually consumed.

Killbourne does not

condemn the sexual imagery that advertising uses so
extensively; but instead criticizes culture's pornographic
attitude toward sex and its contempt for women which this
attitude promotes.
9.

The undertones of the French word jouissance

("pleasure") have been explained in New French Feminisms:
An Anthology:
This pleasure, when attributed to a woman, is
considered to be of a different order from the
pleasure that is represented within the male
libidinal economy often described in terms of the
capitalist gain and profit motive. Women's
jouissance carries with it the notion of fluidity,
diffusion, duration. It is a kind of potlatch in
the world of orgasms, a giving, expending,
dispensing of pleasure without concern about ends
or closure. (36)
Jouissance is a concept in French theory signifying a
totality of satisfaction: intellectual, spiritual, physical,
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and sexual.

Julia Kristeva, for example, argues that

jouissance exists outside of linguistic norms in the realm
of poetic language.

Jouissance resists and disrupts the

symbolic level of language, refusing to be ordered,
structured, and controlled by political and cultural
constraints.
10.

As I struggle to write this essay, I find more and

more that while arguing against masculine linear, logical
reasoning, I consistently compose my writing using
sophisticated, approved, academic language.

I see myself

trapped, feeling that I undermine my own grounds, at the
same time realizing that I can't work against patriarchal
discourse without using its terminology and methodology in
order to dismantle it effectively.

In my subversive

attempts, I remember, however, that language as a signifying
practice is the site of both cultural coercion and
resistance.
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The Consumption of the Maternal Body in the Mirror
Stage and Julia Kristeva's Revision
of the Symbolic Paternal Agency

Jacques Lacan's concept of the Mirror Stage has been
widely theoretized in various philosophical and literary
discourses.

The Lacanian Mirror Stage formation of the

self, which has permeated studies across disciplines, has
drawn substantial attention from feminist scholars.

My

project, following Julia Kristeva's revision and critique of
Lacan's construction of subjectivity, discusses the status
of the maternal body in the Mirror Stage.
Unraveling the maternal body from within the Lacanian
Mirror Stage is an unsettling task of reading a ghostly
presence of mother, or more specifically, of reading her
absence.

My writing, then, addresses the maternal as both

present and absent in the Mirror Stage.

In my analysis, I

focus on the phobic model of the subject, which is built on
and invites misogyny.

I argue that this construct of

subjectivity insists on maintaining the Symbolic 1 at work
through the refusal to read the maternal.

The erasure of

the maternal, then, opens up a space for male subjectivity,
making the female subject the bearer of meaning, not the
maker of meaning.

As a cultural example of the consumption

of the maternal body, I offer a cinematic analysis of Ridley
Scott's Alien and James Cameron's Aliens.
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To situate Lacan's concept of the formation of the
unstable human subject and its relation to language, it is
important to describe the notion of subjectivity itself and
the way it has been theorized in opposition to traditional
views of the human individual.

In the tradition of Western

metaphysics the human being has been perceived as a stable,
autonomous "ego" that determines its own being.

The

Cartesian model governing that tradition, "I think,
therefore I am," has set up the ego as a unified "I" who
rules its being and controls the surrounding world through
the power of its intellect.

In this model, the individual

not only shapes the world around him or herself, but also
functions as the author/creator of meaning.

Moreover, the

"human condition" is characterized as universal and fixed.
Rejecting the notions of universal human nature,
Lacan's concept of subjectivity replaces it with cultural,
social, and historical discourses.

These discourses create

the individual subject and shape its sensibility, still
leaving a moving space for its transformation.
subject is open to change, shift, and fluidity.

Thus, the
While the

Cartesian transcendental ego defines itself as if it were in
a political and social vacuum, the concept of subjectivity
takes into account the social context of race, class, and
gender.

The notion of subjectivity also opposes the idea

that "being" exists prior to linguistic practice, and it
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problematizes the relationship between the individual and
language.
Theorists who work within these assumptions argue that
our subjectivity is not pre-linguistic— i.e. that being or
essence precedes existence and language— but constructed
through various discourses.

Ferdinand de Saussure, for

example, undercuts the "natural" link between the signifier
and the signified, 2 arguing instead that there is a
cultural connection between the two.

The "match" between

the signifier and the signified is culturally enforced in
order to affect and perpetuate the construction of reality.
Prior to Saussure, the notion of the "natural"
correspondence between the signifier and the signified
assumed the existence of universal "being."

Saussure

subverts the belief in the inherent connection between the
signifier and the signified, and points out that the concept
of the signifier answering the signified is an illusion.
Following Saussure's insistence on the arbitrariness of
language, Lacan collapses the traditional notion of "being."
He argues that the process of the construction of
subjectivity is not universal but historical.

Suggesting

the linkage between the notion of the Symbolic (i.e.
language and its institutions) and the subject, Lacan
proposes the idea that subjectivity is both constructed and
determined through language.
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His conception of the subject opposes the Cartesian
cogito which places itself in the epistemological center,
and presents itself as fixed, coherent, intact, and
universal.

The subject, with its mobility, fluidity, and

particularity undercuts the classical understanding of
"being."

The concept of the Cartesian transcendental ego

privileges wholeness and fullness, trying to "fix" identity
and to deny subjectivity as process.

In this model "being"

is presupposed as a stable and harmonious phenomenon.

The

subject-in-process, on the other hand, rests on
fragmentation and splitting, problematizing belief in direct
access to ourselves, our meaning, and truth.

The unstable

position of the subject defies permanence and moves "being"
toward a dialectical dimension.
Within the Cartesian tradition, which is often referred
to as the humanist tradition, the study of language had been
"diachronic;" i.e. words were studied comparatively through
their chronological advancement and analyzed through
history.

Lacan's psycho-linguistic theory of subject

construction moves the study of language out of the abstract
realm of grammar and lexicon, and links it with the
enunciating subject.

His dynamic vision of language stands

in opposition to the traditional structural linguistic model
which leaves out the body and privileges the intellect as
capable of embracing and understanding the workings of
language.

Lacan's analysis not only problematizes and
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destabilizes the "I," but it also points to the dialectical
relationship between the subject and language.

The body and

language are no longer locked in an exclusive binary scheme,
but instead become mutually dependent and always in motion.
Lacan insists that language speaks us as much as we speak
it.

His destabilization of the "I" carries powerful

political implications:

we are in a culture that has

privileged the static "I," and once this stability is
removed, the unstable self becomes coded negatively and
rendered an object of violence.
Lacan believes that one of the earliest stages of
coherence in the construction of the "I" happens in the
Mirror Stage, a stage in the development of subjectivity
prior to the entry into language.

He characterizes the

Mirror Stage in terms of "spatial captation"(4).

The child

finds itself through its reflection in an image.

However,

what the subject experiences is not the wholeness of its
"being," but the fragmentation of its body.

Lacan argues

that the privileging of the subject and its power invites
the "misrecognition" of coherence, unity, and control since
the very nature of the subject is difference.

The Mirror

Stage occurs before the subject finds itself in the Symbolic
order, i.e. before the subject becomes objectified in the
dialectic identification with the other, and before it is
formed and determined in social terms.

Lacan argues that in
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this stage a distinction is introduced between the self and
the other.
Lacan describes the Mirror Stage as an "identification"
stage, i.e. the transformation that takes place in the
subject when it assumes an image (imago).

By rendering its

image, the subject becomes deluded by its autonomy and
seduced by the novelty of the "spatial identification" (4).
Lacan suggests that this position situates the subject in
the imaginary realm, and sets up a split between the "I" and
the subject's body.

In other words, he argues that there is

no "pure" subjectivity and no literal signification.

His

position, then, suggests that the very notion of the "I" is
not inherent and "natural," but culturally constructed and
variable.

The "I" relies on what is other than itself.

According to his theory, through the recognition of a female
"other" who lacks access to the signifying effects of the
phallus, the human subject gains entry into the Symbolic
order of human culture.

Significantly, the phallus, the

symbol of the patriarchal privilege, functions as the
governing signifier and the guarantor of meaning.

The

subject's identity, then, rests on its difference reflected
back from the other.

This curious other, the maternal,

becomes erased, however, from the stage of subject
construction.

The only sign of the maternal in the Mirror

Stage is the child's reflection in the mother's eyes.
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The maternal then is both present and not present in
the Mirror Stage:

present as a mirror and a mere platform,

as a reflection for the human subject:

passive, static,

unchangeable, and therefore universalized; not present in a
sense that it has been theorized as the dis-embodied,
dispassionate, and dis-connected place of "the maternal
organism" (4).

The maternal place of absence subsumes woman

and her difference, and more importantly, differences
between women.
Moreover, in the Mirror Stage, the Mother (necessarily
with the capital "M" since Mother in this construct figures
as an abstract idea) is freed from bodily pleasure, desire,
and pain, and separated from the presence of blood and
physicality.

The Mother's obligatory spatial confinement

not only traps her, but it also secures her invisibility.
This exclusion of the representation of woman's pleasure
becomes essential for the power of the Symbolic.
The only way Lacan writes about the relationship
between the infant and the mother is through the negatively
charged concept of a "primordial Discord" (4) between the
two.

His analysis instills the notion of the contamination

of the subject by the maternal body which serves as a
vessel.

Supporting his suggestion with the research done by

embryologists, Lacan claims that the infant is endowed with
"the presence of certain humoral residues of the maternal
organism" (4).
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The fact that there is no reciprocation or dialectical
involvement between the infant and the mother privileges the
infant, leaving the mother defaced, disfigured, unmarked,
and reduced to the role of the "automaton" (3).
maternal is then both "marked" and "unmarked":

Again, the
marked

through the Symbolic and the cultural representation of the
mother, and unmarked because it is rejected and repudiated.
The representation of woman's pleasure is necessarily left
out since it cannot be measured in phallic terms.

This

exclusion perhaps helps construct Lacan's compulsory
insistence on the universality of the formation of the
subject.
The Mother, her agency, her painful and pleasurable
circumstances, her desires, and needs disappear in the
mirroring.

Although the maternal is readable, it is

consistently and purposefully not read.

As the unsignified

mirror site of the mirror, the maternal is marked as
negative, reduced to the workings of "the phantoms" (2), and
eventually eradicated from Lacanian analysis.

Thus, the

textual analysis of the maternal in the Mirror Stage has to
come through reading the maternal absence.

The consumption

of the maternal points to its threatening presence and to
the male subject's anxiety about the powerful faculty of the
maternal.
One of Lacan's revisionists, Julia Kristeva, takes up
the notion of the erasure of the maternal and attempts to
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reinstate its territory.

Kristeva's recognition of the

maternal role is not only a gesture to rescue the maternal
from the abyss of mirror representation, but it is also a
radical revision of Lacan's ethical position.

In her essay,

"From One Identity to An Other," Kristeva writes about the
repression of the maternal element:

"Language as symbolic

function constitutes itself at the cost of repressing
instinctual drive and continuous relation to the mother"
(136).

However, to understand Kristeva's concept of the

maternal, its powerful ethical and political implications,
it is necessary to consider her rendition of language as a
signifying process.
In "The System and the Speaking Subject," Kristeva,
like Lacan, argues against the Cartesian conception of
language and its transcendental ego that is "cut off from
its body" (78).

She also undercuts Noam Chomsky's model of

Generative Grammar which discusses language only in abstract
terms.

Instead, she proposes a new linguistics which

embraces both the signifying practice and moments of
incomprehensibility, undecidability, disruptions, and
silences.

She centers her analysis on the transgression of

the law of the Symbolic through the power of the Semiotic,
arguing that the symbolic and the semiotic both create the
signifying process.

Both are cultural constructs which

remain in a constant dialectical movement, always mutually
intertwined.

Kristeva writes:
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Because the subject is always both semiotic and
symbolic, no signifying system he produces can be
either 'exclusively' semiotic or 'exclusively'
symbolic, and is instead necessarily marked by an
indebtedness to both. ("Revolution" 93)
While the symbolic represents the paternal law under which
the official linguistic structures operate, the semiotic
embraces the disruptive forces of language which play with
syntax, undermine its order, and mark the realm of the
sensual.

Thus, the semiotic disposition, as Kristeva calls

it, can be traced particularly in the poetic language which
refers to non-linguistic sounds, rhythm, music, painting,
dance, and bodily gestures.

She also attributes "the

transsymbolic, transpaternal function" to the poetic
language (Desire 138).

Thus, the subject of poetic language

"maintains itself at the cost of reactivating this repressed
instinctual, maternal element" (136).

She links the

semiotic, which "introduces wandering and fuzziness into
language," both with the instinctual and the maternal (136).
Kristeva's investigation of maternal alterity is
perhaps most visible in her essay "Stabat Mater."

As Toril

Moi writes in her introduction to The Kristeva Reader,
Kristeva's study of the Virgin Mother coincides with her own
experience of maternity (160).

What is unusual about this

essay is Kristeva's deliberate fragmentation of her writing
and juxtaposition of her personal poetic language with
theoretical religious discourse.

This stylistic move suggests, on the one hand, the
radical splitting and othering of a pregnant woman, and on
the other, the inadequacy of an official paternal discourse
to embrace motherhood. Kristeva problematizes the question
of the representation of the maternal by displaying both the
symbolic and the semiotic dispositions working side by side.
By writing a personal piece on the maternal in a passionate,
highly visual, and poetic way in contrast to a theoretical
"study," she risks the accusation of being "emotional" or
"irrational."

But, I think, this is precisely her goal:

her visually mapped writing demonstrates how writing as a
form of signifying practice lingers in the space of both the
symbolic and the semiotic and how the personal narrative of
the maternal always already works next to the historical
discourse on motherhood.
Reevaluating the cult of the Virgin Mary, Kristeva
argues that Western Christianity obliterates and disfigures
Mary herself.

Again, like the maternal itself, Mary is

"marked" and "unmarked":

marked through the miracle of the

immaculate conception and her position as the Mother of
Jesus, and unmarked because impregnated without sexuality,
having her body reduced to "the ear of the virginal body,
the tears, and the breast" (194).

Through her peculiar

construction, the Virgin Mary becomes the "guardian of
paternal power" (188).

Kristeva sees Mary's ambivalence as

having serious political and historical implications:
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[S]he is informed that filial relationship rests
not with the flesh but with the name or, in other
words, that any possible matrilinearism is to be
repudiated and the symbolic link alone is to last.
(188)
While reading Kristeva's theoretical argument, it
becomes clear that the religious discourse of the West has
worked to sanitize Mary of bodily pleasure, pain, or rage,
and it has relegated her to the inaccessible sphere of the
"virginal maternal" (199).

By contrast, Kristeva's account

of her own pregnancy shows the interweavings of her
euphoria, affection, anguish, pain, and anger.

The maternal

she experiences cannot be translated into or controlled by
the symbolic law:

"My body is no longer mine, it doubles

up, suffers, bleeds..." (190).

The language of the symbolic

paternal agency is at best deficient to illustrate the
immeasurable and unconfinable maternal body:

"[L]anguage is

powerless to locate myself for and state myself to the
other..." (196).

Kristeva's insistence on a bodily

division, scatteredness, and separation stands in opposition
to the symbolic construct of the maternal which gives it
either a space of "an exacerbated masochism"

or a censored

place of jouissance (200).
Kristeva hypothesizes that the concept of maternal
virginity is a way of dealing with "feminine paranoia"
(199).

She claims that belief in the mother is not only

based on the repression of the maternal eroticism, but is
also rooted in fear.

Her own writing of the maternal works
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against this phobia, and, at the same time, recognizes that
the paternal agency rests on the idea of controlling the
maternal.

Aliens as an Example of the Colonization of the Maternal

Treating film as another signifying practice, I want to
offer a discussion of Ridley Scott's Alien (1979) and its
sequel, James Cameron's Aliens (1986), as examples of the
cultural narratives which attempt to misconstruct, repress,
and control the maternal.

These unsettling science-

fiction/horror constructs of Hollywood production have
attracted the attention of feminist scholars who discuss the
notion of woman as an alien, and the representation of
motherhood as monstrosity.
the Big Mamas':

For example, in "vThe Battle of

Feminism and the Alienation of Women,"

Susan Jeffords argues that Aliens "presents a Nfeminism'
that can succeed only by making women valien' to themselves"
(73).

Lynda Zwinger, on the other hand, in her article,

"Blood Relations:
Bug Mother,"

Feminist Theory Meets the Uncanny Alien

addresses the issue of an uncanny figure of

Mother who not only needs to be controlled but destroyed as
well:

"[T]he asexual-virgin mother Ripley appropriates the

big phalli of the Colonial Marine Corps and becomes a
monstrous killing machine in order to fight an even more
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monstrous mother (supplied with multiple organic phalli) and
thereby defeats the monster/mother in herself as well" (82).
To expand the idea of mother as monster, and to expose
the cultural anxiety about motherhood which these texts
disclose, I want to consider the birthing process in Alien/s
as the fierce disruption and rupture of the body.

I want to

argue that the masculine diegetic space 3 of Alien/s
attempts to colonize and control the monstrous female body
which is constructed, policed, and eventually abandoned
ambiguously by this very narrative (the closures of both
Alien and Aliens leave the "monster" merely floating in
outer space).

The ideological discourse of these films

abjects the Alien-Mother-Monster to preserve its own
coherence and to present us with the image of the paternal
colonizing victory.

This unnerving theme of abjectness

guides the films' structures, which attempt to preserve
patriarchal signifying practice.
Both films address the question of women's access to
power. While both female and male characters are presented
as possessing seemingly equal power against the unknown
horrifying strength of the Alien, the female protagonist,
Ripley, gains access to power only in outer space, possibly
suggesting that her feminism has no place yet within the
human social structure.

In one of the opening scenes of

Aliens, when Ripley makes a report to the Company's
executives about the deadly encounter with the Alien, her
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story is not believed and the "case" is closed without a
command for further investigation.

Her license to operate

as a flight officer is suspended and she is given a mediocre
job.

Clearly, Ripley is powerless within the capitalistic

operations of the Company.

Her story is not only dismissed

as invalid, but she is also punished for assuming the role
of a "leader-survivor."
"wins":

It is only in cosmos that Ripley

she overrides the Company's technology and becomes

staged as a "natural" commander who moves beyond the space
of cold calculations and impersonal mediations.

In other

words, she rejects insensitivity, ruthless aggressiveness,
and save-myself-first sensibility in order to face the
Alien.

As Jeffords warns us, however, "she is employing

these characteristics (nurturing, unmediated communication)
to reject the alien— the image of woman as reproducer" (7).
The narrative of Alien/s is occupied by historically
masculine constructs:

the capitalist Company, referred to

as "Mother," its technology and warfare gear, the aggressive
Marine platoon fixated on the idea of destruction, and the
masculine space of colonization itself.

In this space,

women characters are repeatedly alienated from each other,
securing the order of the paternal law.

In both films,

Ripley does not bond with any female characters except for a
child.

In Alien, another female on board, Lambert, is

represented as weak and passive, while in Aliens, a female
Marine, Vazquez, is masculinized to the point that she blurs
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gender boundaries; "Hey, Vazquez, have you ever been
mistaken for a man?" she is asked by her Marine comrade.
Ripley's character, meant to "rip," is explicitly
masculinized in order to render her a suitable heroine for
the colonizing process.

From the very beginning she opposes

"studying" the Alien and agrees to participate in the
colonial trip only to destroy It.

Throughout the narrative

there are various codes of masculinity attributed to Ripley:
her muscular body, her short hair, her smoking, her
aggressiveness and leadership, and the harsh language she
uses, just to name a few.

At the same time, to prepare her

for the role of mother— in a revised version of the nuclear
family which emerges at the end of Aliens— Ripley is endowed
with some overtly feminine, nurturing features.
opening scenes show Ripley frozen in

While both

hypersleep with her

cat, most of the scenes of Alien/s in outer space are
devoted to her obsessive rescuing of a cat and a little
girl-survivor, Newt.

Clearly, the emphasis on the maternal

drives, to use Kristeva's term, points to Ripley's future
role as a mother.

Ripley's position as "mother" is produced

to reactivate the discourse of the family.

Paradoxically,

however, Ripley is linked with a child to whom she has not
given birth, suggesting that, in fact, she is free from the
bodily maternal.
To disclose the workings of "feminine paranoia," I am
particularly interested in the battle scene between Ripley
/
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and the Alien which takes place in the gruesome vaginal
abyss of the Mother/Monster ("Stabat Mater" 199).

An

asexual woman-warrior, Ripley is designated to fight the
slimy, bountiful, and uncontrollable womb which poses a
threat to humanity itself through its excessive and
expandable power of reproduction.

It becomes clear that the

Aliens' destructive reproductive power is the most menacing
concept to the colonizers.

The Alien is threatening

precisely because it is capable of giving birth to itself,
of multiplying her body and powers beyond any imaginable
control.

As Jeffords observes:

"The alien is an emblem of

fertility gone out of control, its power to reproduce
unbounded, its desire unlimited" (80).

Mothering and the

woman-as-reproducer are the films' subtexts which, with the
narrative closure, become subsumed by the triumph of the
paternal Symbolic Order.
Kristeva, who complicates the concept of the Symbolic
by introducing the notion of the abject, can be of help
here.

The abject "is radically excluded" from the

established order and occupies the place where "meaning
collapses" (2).

Thus, the abject, which is the site of

banishment and uncleanliness, stays at the borders of
signification.

Kristeva claims that the Symbolic Order

thrusts the abject aside in order to stay pure and
unaltered.

The abject, then, secures the position of the

Symbolic as intact:

"It is thus not lack of cleanliness or
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health that causes abjection but what disturbs identity,
system, order" (4).

As she suggests, "the abject does not

respect borders, positions, rules" (4).
Alien is clearly the abject:

In this case, the

"ejected beyond the scope of

the possible, the tolerable, the thinkable" (1).
Throughout both films, the Alien-abject is referred to
as "It," "They," or "She," suggesting the impossibility of
pinning it down.

Thus, the Alien's moveable identity poses

a threat to the phallocentric Symbolic Order which
constructs its system according to singular borders of
identity.

Clearly, the Alien-signifier transgresses the

boundaries of homogeneity, gender, stability, and origin,
and it becomes the site of collapsing meaning.
successfully disrupts signification.

The Alien

Till the end, the

spectator never finds out where the Alien comes from, where
it belongs to, and where it is going.

Thus, the narrative

busily works towards the annihilation of the Alien-abject in
order to restore a space where meaning finally "makes
sense."

The Alien's powerful fragmentation, multiplication,

alteration, and gender mobility need to be suppressed to
restore the disturbed power of the Symbolic.
The Alien's power and intelligence are unquestionable:
its acidic blood melts both the human species and their
technology; it can transgress all spatial boundaries; it can
reproduce beyond any imaginable control; and it can fight
with its own body.

The Alien, unlike the colonizers, does
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not need any sophisticated weaponry to defend itself.
Through its fragmented, yet omnipotent body, the Alien is
expandable, excessive, truculent, and indestructible.
Alien is a survivor.

The

The Mother/Monster clearly not only

violates the patriarchal order, but it also trespasses its
prescribed cultural boundaries.
The Alien becomes both the abominable threat to the
colonizers and a curious specimen which they want to possess
and control.

Through the representation of its body, the

Alien is the site of repulsion and terror, but also of
desire.

The Alien's revolting and slimy "otherness" serves

as the colonizers' excuse to cover up their own aggressive
intentions and their colonizing ruthless expansion beyond
space and time.

In Alien, for example, Ash, the Company's

android, enraptured by the Alien's "perfect organism"

says,

"I admire its purity," and opts for testing the Alien, even
at the cost of endangering the crew members.

The computer-

Mother reveals to Ripley that the very mission of their ship
Nostromo was to investigate and to bring back any
intelligent organism.

As Zwinger remarks:

"The real story

is utterly monstrous:

the Company has decided to use the

human crew as whatever kind of fodder it takes to bring back
a truly appalling organism for the corporate biological
warfare division" (75).

In Aliens, Burke-the-ruthless

colonizer, who even attempts to impregnate Ripley's body
with the Alien's embryo by letting the baby-alien out of the
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testing canister while she is asleep, carries Ash's mission
of appropriating the Alien for the Company's needs because
the Alien is an "important species."
Although Alien/s attempts to privilege the clearly
defined category of "the human," the very structure of the
narrative successfully disrupts the human/animal,
human/machine, and mother/monster distinctions.

The moment

the narratives of Alien/s set up these dichotomies, they
become shifted, displaced, and confused.

Thus, the constant

interaction between the animal, machine, and human worlds
becomes an underlying structure of the two films.

The

borders between humans and animals are set in the very
beginning of Aliens when the belligerent and anxious Marines
want to know if their mission is "just" another "bug-hunt."
The Marines' impatient and ironic "yeah, yeah" during
Ripley's lecture about the Alien's omnipotence suggests
their unquestioned faith in the superiority of their
technology.

Curiously, the Marines label the Alien not only

as a "bug," but also as an "illegal-alien," resonating
xenophobic trepidations about the disruption of cultural
"purity."
However, it is curious that the Marines also blur the
division between the human and the machine.
some extent, aliens themselves.

They are, to

They are "cyborgs"— hybrids

of human and machine— whose aim is to terminate the enemy
without any sentiments.

The Marines-cyborgs represent the
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technological power of late capitalism at its best.

They

are "state-of-the-art" soldiers, "bad-asses," whose bodies
blend in with the completely automated weaponry they
possess.

They have cameras attached to their heads, carry

powerful guns glued to their hips, wear locators on their
wrists and motion trackers.

Their bodies carry knives,

grenades, pistols, and as a fusion of automatons and humans,
they are posed as capable of transgressing the boundary of
human endurance and aptitude.
The very mise-en-scene of Alien/s unsuccessfully
strives to fix the unruly human/animal boundary.

The human

characters are usually fully lit and well visible, unlike
the Alien which occupies the concealed and ambiguous space
of murkiness, ugliness, and repulsiveness.

The constructed

coherence and congruity of the human cast is constantly
juxtaposed with the Alien's fragmentation and displacement.
The Alien's space, however, is the Company's construct
itself:

the alienated station-colony, entangled metal

constructions, the maze of confusing hallways, wires,
hanging chains, air-shafts, and claustrophobic laboratories.
The confusion of human/animal borders is displayed
through the interaction between the crew members as well.
When, in Aliens, Ripley understands that Burke serves as a
merciless executor of the Company's colonizing interests,
she expresses her disgust about his slimy intentions, thus
upsetting the human/animal boundary again:

"I don't know

61

which species is worse."

Later, when the crew has already

lost several of its invincible Marines, and when an
uncontrollable terror and darkness permeate the atmosphere,
Ripley suggests:

"They got the power."

One of the Marines,

Hudson, who already lost his "cool," screams:
mean they got the power?!

"What do you

How could they cut the power,

man, they are god-damn ANIMALS!!i
However, the ultimate disruption of human/animal
borders and confusion of who the mother is and who the
monster is comes with the staging of both the Alien and the
Company itself.

In Alien, the navigating Computer-Mother is

not only programmed to bring the Alien back to earth, but it
also betrays Ripley when its self-destructive mechanism
refuses to turn off.

Watching Ripley's desperate flight for

survival, we are presented with the question of which
monster is worse:

the unknown Alien or the supposedly

familiar Mother-Company?

Aliens, however, more so than the

first film, reveals colonizing impulses which are aimed
directly at the body.

The colonized body, then, assumes the

faculty of the maternal.

Both the Company and the Alien

operate within the same colonizing sensibility.

Although

the narrative attempts to romanticize the crew's struggle to
rescue "humanity" itself from the aggressive "Big Mama" who
is "running the whole show," the violent intrusion into the
body is actually performed by both the Company and the
Alien.

The Company surgically implants PDTs (Personal Data
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Transmitters) in order to "possess" its colonists, just as
the Alien penetrates the human body to lay its eggs inside
it.

As Jeffords concludes:

"[T]he alien is the embodiment

of the Company's suppressed desires for control through
complete colonization/inhabitation of the body" (76).
The Alien-mother, thus, is entangled in a mode of
double colonization:

while she is the target of the

Company's colonization, she herself attempts to colonize the
human body and to blur the imaginable limits between what is
human and what is animal.

Her mergence with the human body,

then, culminates in violent birthing.

The Alien's

reproductive cycle is crucial for understanding the idea of
birth as a shattering intrusion and fracture. Mother/
Monster's egg produces a spider-like flying creature that
impregnates a human being with the Alien's embryo.

The seed

then expands within the human breast and eventually births
itself by piercing and rupturing the human body.
destroys the human body-base.

The burst

Curiously, however, while in

Alien the first victim of the Alien is a man, Kane, who dies
through the Alien's birth (Zwinger calls it "[T]he bloody
birth parody," and "a horrific erection parody"), Aliens
shows only women's bodies as being disrupted and violated
(75).

While the male characters are being devoured by the

Alien in off-screen space, the female characters (excluding
masculinized Ripley) and the Alien become visible objects of
violence.

For example, the first colonizer whom the Marines
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find already in the Alien's slimy and oozing cocoon is a
woman.

Contaminated by the alien— as Jeffords says,

"[C]ontaminated by reproduction"— a woman begs to be
destroyed (80).

What this scene performs is the idea that

reproduction itself is a threat and that it needs to be
violently controlled.

This unnerving phenomenon of

rupturing women's bodies through birth, constructed to feed
the spectatorial anxiety, reveals the phobic fear of the
maternal that Kristeva writes about and the compulsive need
to control it.
The happy-end emergence of the nuclear family with
vulnerable, crippled father Hicks, triumphant-aggressive
mother Ripley, and an adopted enduring child Newt does not
challenge the patriarchal norms.

As Jeffords observes:

"Hicks is not simply a man Ripley met in space, but is
instead a Marine sent there to protect the Company's
interests; Newt is not Ripley's child, but is instead a
daughter of the Company's colonizing strategies.

The new

family, product of the new vfeminism,' can now afford to
stop fighting the corporate because it is the
corporate" (77).

The Alien's transgressing body, however,

left drifting in the cosmos, holds the question of the
maternal unresolved, still feeding the paternal agency with
the trepidation about maternity.
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Notes

1.

Linda Kintz in her chapter, "Relearning Language:

A Clean Break or the Mess of Coagulation," offers a
comprehensive explanation of the Symbolic:

"[T]he Symbolic-

-the larger, symbolic structures into which we are all
inserted, the system of signs that organizes naming, syntax,
semantics, denotations that historically precede us" (101).
See The Subject's Tragedy:
Theory and Drama.

Political Poetics, Feminist

(Ann Arbor:

The University of Michigan

Press, 1993) .
2.

Saussure claims that a linguistic sign, e.g. a

word, unites a concept and an acoustic image, not a thing
and a name.

He calls the concept "signified" and the

acoustic image, a sound, "signifier."

The unity of the two

forms a complete sign, a verbal sound, a word.

So, the

"signifier" is the "sound-image," and the "signified" is the
meaning generated by this sound.

The signifier and the

signified are always moving together and cannot exist
separately.
3.

In Aesthetics of Film, Jacques Aumont employs the

literary terms of the narrative, narration and diegesis as
useful for the study of cinematic images.

The narrative is

a literary term referring to telling a story.

In cinema,

however, the narrative is more complex as it embraces
images, spoken and written words, sounds and music.

Also,

65

the film narrative is presented as a closed discourse.
Narration concerns itself with the relation between the
enunciator and the enunciation.

Diegesis (a story) is

characterized as the signified content, even if the content
lacks "dramatic intensity."

Diegesis presupposes the

implementation of fictional elements (attracting the
viewer's attention more to the imaginary than to the real).
Diegesis refers to the story which is formed by a viewer/
subject who composes his/her unique narrative out of given
elements.
(Austin:

See Aesthetics of Film.

Trans.

University of Texas Press, 1992).

Richard Neupert.
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War Upon the Body: Decoding Pornographic
Sensibility and Unleashing Female Desires
In the patriarchal landscape of modern culture, at the
time when the intensification of violence against women is
still rising, pornographic imagery has come to be treated as
an enactment of male brutality.

Trying to situate myself

theoretically to write about pornography, I find myself
amidst the split which has occurred within the feminist
movement along the lines of what pornography might signify.
Although both the anti-pornography and pro-pornography
feminists critique violence against women, and
objectification and fragmentation of women's bodies always
available to the male consumers, they come up with different
interpretations of how to "read" pornography and even
dispute whether to read it at all.
The anti-porn feminists like Robin Morgan, Andrea
Dworkin, Catherine MacKinnon, or Catherine Itzin generally
equate male sexuality with violence, and perceive
pornography as a depiction of this violence.

In the 1980's,

in Minneapolis, MacKinnon and Dworkin drafted a bill
outlawing the depiction of sexual subordination of women,
and defined pornography as "the graphic sexually explicit
subordination of women through pictures or words" (MacKinnon
300).

On the other side of the spectrum, pro-porn feminists

dispute this proposed definition of pornography and its
suggested implication of women's protection against
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subordination and objectification.

Lynne Segal, a pro-porn

feminist, in "Does Pornography Cause violence?," describes
the convictions of the Feminists Against Censorship group in
this way:

"They see it as a complete mistake to reduce the

dominance of sexism and misogyny in our culture to sexuality
and its representations" (8).

Generally, the pro-porn,

anti-censorship feminists suggest that what we need is not
the termination of pornographic imagery, but more sexually
outspoken materials produced by women coming from different
racial and class backgrounds.

What becomes critical in

their discussion is also the need to debate a diversity of
sexual representations in women's lives like masturbation,
S/M relations, bondage, or homosexuality, together with the
pressing economic and social issues of women's exploitation.
My project stands on the pro-porn side.

While closely

examining the binary opposition between pornography and
erotica, which appears to stand at the center of the anti
porn debate, I want to seek the possibilities of a feminist
re-reading of power, pleasure, and the politics of the gaze.
The unsettling and multilayered discourse of
pornography not only consistently refuses to order itself in
a coherent fashion, but it also resists a stable and fixed
interpretation.

It seems crucial to stress that the

discourse of pornography has not been the monolithic
construct it is often presented to be.

Carol Clover in her
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introduction to Dirty Looks, an anthology which stands on
the anti-censorship side, writes:
It [pornography] comprises a great variety of
images and scenarios, many of which fall outside
the standard scheme of male-female relations, many
of which contradict one another, and many of which
have little to do with women (as in the case of
gay male or male transvestite pornography, for
example) or even with men (lesbian pornography).
(2 )

What Clover rightly addresses is the complicatedness and
multiple layering of pornographic imagery.

She draws our

attention to the fact that we cannot address pornographic
sensibility solely in terms of the heterosexual dominant
structure.

The heterosexual normative model which has

historically presented itself as the "universal," and
therefore the legitimate mode of being, is constantly being
resisted by both theory and praxis.

For example, Judith

Butler in Bodies that Matter undermines the Lacanian concept
of the phallus as the transcendental signifier which always
guarantees full meaning (89).

She suggests that because the

phallus is only a part of the signifying practice and not
its origin, it is as "moveable" as any other signifier.

In

other words, the phallus as a privileged signifier is not
static and fixed, but fluid and open to signifying
modulations.

Butler claims that the notion of the phallus

as a privileged signifier comes from its cultural
reinforcement, but precisely because it is constructed, it
can be manipulated and deprivileged.

Butler herself performs such a manipulation in the
chapter "The Lesbian Phallus and the Morphological
Imaginary" where she introduces the idea of the lesbian
phallus, which displaces the notion of the penis as the
imaginary site of power.

By displacing the idea of the

penis— as the symbol of the heterosexist scheme— Butler
suggests that sexual difference does not depend on the
anatomical parts themselves.

The lesbian phallus frees

bodily desires from the monolithic concept of pleasure.
Butler also proposes that to say the phallus is lesbian both
suggests that it is and it is not the site of masculine
power.

The lesbian phallus evokes the equation of the

phallus with the penis, but at the same time, through its
reconfiguration, it undercuts this equation.

Thus, the

lesbian phallus elicits the idea of the penis and erases it.
By constructing the notion of the lesbian phallus, Butler
undercuts the normative, heterosexist model of "sex" which
seeks to fix gender.

Resisting this assumption, she insists

that the concept of sexuality is not locked in a fixed
heterosexual framework, but that it is open to the workings
of the signifying practice itself.

Thus, a "reading" of

pornography necessarily needs to overstep the boundary of
the heterosexist frame in order to challenge the normative
vision of sexuality.
The deprivileging of the imaginary phallus and the
factual penis that Butler talks about can be seen, for
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example, in On Our Backs, a pro-porn, anti-censorship
magazine "for the adventurous lesbian."

The March/April

1994 issue of On Our Backs features, as its special concern,
questions and representations of lesbians, sex, and
motherhood.

The magazine boldly embraces the idea of the

pornographic body (Clover's term) by presenting women who
are nude and pregnant.

I think that the unsettling black

and white photographs of OOB successfully collapse the rigid
binary of "pornography" and "erotica" set by pro-censorship
feminists. Instead of maintaining firm borders, these
photographs start occupying the space of fluidity which
resists clear-cut codification.
The pornography/erotica split has played a crucial role
in the anti-porn and pro-censorship debate.
Pornography:

In her book

Men Possessing Women, Andrea Dworkin, who has

provided one of the strongest feminist voices in the anti
pornography campaign, refers to this division:
Feminists have made honorable efforts to define
the difference [between pornography and erotica],
in general asserting that erotica involves
mutuality and reciprocity, whereas pornography
involves dominance and violence, (preface)
This boundary of difference between "mutuality" and
"violence," however, refuses to stay fixed.

For example,

one of the articles in this issue of OOB presents an image
of a pregnant woman with an attached dildo harness.

This

photograph might be interpreted as violent, but, as a
photographic representation of a text, this picture becomes
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a visual enactment of the writing, which describes a love
scene between two lesbians, one of whom is pregnant (30-31).
The impossibility of determining a fixed enclosure between
"violence/dominance" and "mutuality/ reciprocity," that
Dworkin stresses as the critical distinction between
pornography and erotica, shows in this particular instance
not only a resistance to this strict dichotomy but also an
effective explosion of its theoretical framework.
I analyze the image of a pregnant body with a dildo
harness to challenge and complicate Dworkin's argument about
the position of a woman in heterosexual intercourse, where
the female is portrayed as the passive object/recipient of
the invading male sexual power, and where male violence is
projected as "natural." Dworkin also assumes the
heterosexual model as the normative sexual mode of
expressing one's desire:
Sex, a word potentially so inclusive and
evocative, is whittled down by the male so that,
in fact, it means penile intromission. Commonly
referred to as "it," sex is defined in action only
by what the male does with his penis. Fucking—
the penis thrusting— is the magical, hidden
meaning of "it," the reason for sex, the expensive
experience through which the male realizes his
sexual power. In practice, fucking is an act of
possession— simultaneously and act of ownership,
taking, force; it is conquering; it expresses in
intimacy power over and against, body to body,
person to thing. "The sex act" means penile
intromission followed by penile thrusting, or
fucking. The woman is acted on; the man acts and
through action expresses sexual power, the power
of masculinity. Fucking requires that the male
act on one who has less power and this valuation
is so deep, so completely implicit in the act,
that the one who is fucked is stigmatized as
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feminine during the act even when not anatomically
female. In the male system, sex is the penis, the
penis is sexual power, its use in fucking is
manhood [emphasis added]. (23)
I quote this long passage to show that ultimately Dworkin
does not challenge the patriarchal structure at work and
does not negotiate an active space for female subjectivity.
Rather, she reinforces male privilege, and, by using
pornographic language, she further objectifies and
victimizes the female subject.

I want to argue that Dworkin

universalizes the female body while neglecting its
specificities and particularities amidst the multiplicity of
sexual practices.

She also ascribes passivity to female

subjects as their "normal" sexual mode.

Female desire is

presented here as either non-existent or static at best, and
it constructs itself as forever fixed by the workings of the
masculine power.

Describing heterosexual intercourse in

such a way, Dworkin privileges male desire by locating the
penis at the center of her discourse.

Linda Williams in her

book Hard Core challenges this very assumption:
If phallic sexuality is contaminated by power,
this tactic seems to say, if it is essentially
violent and perverse, then female sexuality shall
be defined as its opposite: as not-violent and
not-perverse— a pure and natural pleasure
uncontaminated by power. (20)
As Williams appropriately suggests, the relations of power
cannot be left out of the discussion on female sexuality.
In other words, Williams opposes Dworkin's idea that male
sexuality is inherently violent and that women are asexual
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beings occupying the space of sensual gentleness, free of
power relations.
The female lovers described in the text next to the
dildo-with-a-harness-photograph both metaphorically and
literally possess the "lesbian phallus."

More importantly,

however, the dildo/phallus belongs to both women.

The

interchangeability of the dildo/phallus suggests the
shifting power positions between the lovers and their
attempt to collapse Dworkin's sexual categories of
subject/object.

Moreover, the pregnant woman, whose

"natural" mode might be thought of as gentle and non
violent, is instead portrayed as the instigating seductress
who acts roughly and fervently.

The lesbian women, who both

"own" the penis, undercut Dworkin's assumption that the
owner of the penis is inherently the powerful male subject
performing the violent act of penetration.

Clearly, the

artificial penis does not become the center of their
intercourse, as Dworkin would like to have it, but rather it
is used as one of the many ways in which their sexual play
is expressed.
This pornography/erotica split inevitably emerges in
almost any discussion on pornography.
documentary film Patently Offensive:

For example, in the
Porn under Siege

(1992), one of the representatives of Women Against
Pornography describes this separation in the following way:
We make a distinction between pornography and
erotica. We define erotica as any kind of
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sexually explicit material premised on equality,
mutuality, reciprocity. One of the unfortunate
problems is the pornographers have a habit of
calling a lot of the material they produce, that
is very demeaning to women, that subordinates
women, "erotica." So, there is a little bit of a
problem with language [emphasis added] here.
Ruby Rich in her discussion of yet another documentary on
pornography, Not a Love Story (1983), addresses this very
issue of language.

I believe that she attempts to reveal

and undermine the disorderly distinction between porn and
erotica and to move us into a more dialectical space of
understanding language:
But, what is pornography and what is eroticism?
One is bad, the other is good (guess which).
Fixing the dividing line is rather like redlining
a neighborhood: the "bad" neighborhood is always
the place where someone else lives. Porn is the
same. If I like it, it's erotic; if you like it,
it's pornographic. (410)
The arbitrariness of signs becomes critical to this question
of meaning because language itself, as a signifying
practice, refuses to signify universally and to provide a
timeless interpretation regardless of the specificity of
social and historical conditions. 1
Butler's discussion of language can aptly illustrate
the impossibility of fixing language and interpretation.
Working off the assumption that we cannot fully control or
own the discourse, Butler undermines the idea of the
"authorial intention."

Language inevitably "escapes" the

writer (writer understood in a broad sense of this word to
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include those who "produce" pornography as well) and refuses
to order itself in an unchangeable and stable fashion.

The

one who produces speech always already works in a space of
moving signification and, therefore, neither can fully
control his/her discursive production nor prevent
signification from working against his/her intentions.
Butler also argues that we cannot own signification;
interpretation of one's words always leaves us in an open,
often vulnerable place where we speak and are spoken at the
same time (241).

Thus, in the light of this assumption, the

very idea of deciding to produce or "read" pornographic
materials in terms of fixed meaning becomes futile at best.
I believe that post-structural theory, which addresses the
notion that "meaning" is not stable but positional, stays
crucial for decoding the pornographic sensibility. 2
And one may ask now why is the discussion of language
vital to the debate on pornography?

Being situated in a

post-structural theoretical framework, I believe that we
cannot talk about cultural representations (porn being one
of them) without reminding ourselves that we are always
already creating within the linguistic space of a
historically specific culture.

We need to look at the

institution of pornography as a cultural form that is
unstable and historically shifting.

By doing this, we may

start challenging the anti-porn position that the very
institution of porn refuses a space for female agency.

We
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may also start looking at places, like the performance art
of Annie Sprinkle, Susie Bright, or Valie Export, where
women can negotiate a dynamic space for their agency within
the heterogeneity of sexual representations.

Porn is

language, and yet, it has often been talked about as if it
existed outside language, outside specific cultural and
socio-historical contexts.

Relating post-structural theory

to the persistent porn/erotica distinction, I want to
emphasize, using Linda William's words, that "one person's
pornography is another person's erotica" (6).
The marginalization of the pornographic discourse and
its degradation to the lowest ranks of art is also
historically connected with traditional perceptions of
artistic creation.

The porn/erotica debate is inevitably

linked with the polemic on high and low art.

Traditional

aesthetic concepts consider art as a sublime value which can
be embraced only by a sophisticated audience.

Within this

theoretical framework, art is positioned as a separate
sphere of experience, accessible exclusively to
spectators and participants.

preferred

Thus, the intellectual

(historically white male) is destined to experience sublime
art, which poses itself as "true."

The "ordinary"

spectator, not being refined enough, is left out and denied
access to this experience.

Considering this notion of art

alongside the issue of pornography, I want to quote Clover
who addresses this situation in the following way:

"Pornography's shame lies in the fact that it has one
simple, unequivocal intention:

to excite its consumer.

We

are in general suspicious of forms ... that aim themselves
so directly at the body ..." (3).

Clover draws on an

assumption which claims that there are two separate spheres
of experiencing art forms:

through the power of the

intellect and through the body.

Not surprisingly, forms

that are considered intellectual (psychological dramas,
experimental films, for example) are traditionally linked
with the mind, while "lower" forms like melodramas or horror
films (Clover's example) are associated with bodily
experience.

Without a doubt, pornography falls into the

category of low art; Whereas erotica occupies the realm of
high art.
The weight of this logic suggests that erotica is the
legitimate sexual mode expressed in art, while porn is the
dirty discourse capable of dangerously exciting the body.
Because pornography is often thought of as aiming only at
the body, the arising implication suggests that porn does
not have to be embraced by critical thinking.

Making an

attempt to philosophize the body, Butler claims that
signification is traditionally talked about as if it were an
abstract and universal entity with no connection to the
body.

She insists that we should include the body in the

debates on hegemonic ideology to examine how the subject is
culturally produced in terms of gender (231).

In her
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preface to Bodies that Matter, however, Butler acknowledges
the difficulties of writing about the body and its
materiality:
I reflected that this wavering might be the
vocational difficulty of those trained in
philosophy, always at some distance from corporeal
matters, who try in that disembodied way to
demarcate bodily terrains: they invariably miss
the body or, worse, write against it. (ix)
I believe that the anti-porn argument, by insisting on the
porn/erotica segregation, does write against the body.
Wanting to find places that insist on addressing the body,
we may look at the controversial performance art of Annie
Sprinkle, 3 as an attempt to embrace the body in praxis and
to open up this mystified realm of high art.

Her

performances aim at removing art from the pedestal of high
culture and making it available to the masses.

In that

sense, Sprinkle's performance is a political maneuver.

She

is clearly politicizing and problematizing art by bringing
an awareness of the diversity of sexual representations to
aesthetic sensibility.
The discussion of high/low art and the erotica/porn
split is a legacy of Western metaphysics which has organized
itself around Aristotelian logic.

This phallogocentric

dichotomy, which is based on either/or exclusionary
oppositions, has privileged oneness, and denied dialectical
way of thinking that would be based on a constant movement.
This logic disciplines us to think in terms of binary
oppositions like man/woman, self/other, civilized/savage,
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culture/nature, mind/body or the discussed erotica/porn
dichotomy.

Consequently, in the established hierarchy, the

place of agency historically belongs to the privileged white
male intellectual who claims the cultural space of art and
its interpretation.

I want to go back to Rich's discussion

of Not a Love Story to illustrate how this film is
constructed within the realms of this binary thinking and
how it ultimately preserves the historically privileged
space of the male viewer of culture.

I also wish to show

how language escapes the producers of the film and how it
starts signifying against the authors' intentions. 4

I hope

to provide a subversive reading of Not a Love Story by using
it to challenge the anti-porn stance, a position which this
film attempts to embrace.
Rich provides an extraordinary analysis of Bonnie
Klein's Not a Love Story, the first documentary addressing
the issue of pornography from a woman's perspective.

Rich

is very critical about the film's use of the camera, its
religious preaching, its manipulation with voyeurism, and
its limited political and social focus.

She argues that the

film ultimately does not help in looking critically at the
issue of pornography, but that it participates in the
voyeurism and objectification of women perpetuated by
patriarchy.

She believes that the camera's work is

representative of the whole film's structure:

the camera

along with the male customers are invisible and protected by
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the filmmaker.

Often the camera is positioned behind the

shoulder of the male client, and it never offers a shot from
the point of view of the women on stage.

The film also

leaves out the economic forces and social pressures that
make women move into the porn industry.

Although the

filmmakers mention the connection of pornography and
advertising, they never explicate the crucial correlation
between the two.

They also omit an analysis of consumer

capitalist culture which propels pornography, and even more
importantly, they free the film from the issues of race and
class.
Rich believes that the issue of pornography
depersonalizes the discourse of sexuality, and that the porn
debate locks itself within the futile eroticism-versuspornography distinction.

Moreover, the whole debate is

framed within the terms of heterosexuality.

Ultimately, Not

a Love Story, embraced by the mass media, does not pose any
threat to the male privilege.

In its highly emotional

appeal, it safely overlooks social analysis, historical
perspectives and larger questions of representation.
I agree with Rich's analysis.

What interests me here,

though, is the film's attempt to freeze and singularise
female desire, while preserving the masculine codes of
looking.

The act of looking, the gaze, is intertwined with

relations of power.

Since historically the male subject

occupies the place of active agency, consequently, the gaze
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and the power which governs its course belongs to the male
who dictates the acts Of looking.

However, this is not to

say that women do not look and that they do not produce
forms of art that subvert the traditional constructions of
looking.

On the contrary, as the British photographer Grace

Lau argues in her essay "Confession of a Complete
Scopophiliac," women artists are fiercely piercing through
the male-monopolized industry of visual imagery, claiming
their space as both active producers and lookers (193).
Not a Love Story, however, does not negotiate a space
for critical analysis about pornography, nor does it
challenge the structure of a male gaze.

Instead, the film

speaks to the female spectators through tears of the
participating women researchers, assuming the uniformity of
female readings of pornography.

The film attempts to

scrutinize the workings of scopophilic pleasure generated by
pornographic sensibility, but it ends up reinscribing the
gaze where it traditionally belongs:

to the male viewer.

Watching the stripper's, Linda Lee Tracey, cathartic crusade
through the porn world, we are coerced into thinking that
women do not derive pleasure from looking.

The film also

suggests that those women who still participate in the
production of porn for a variety of reasons, simply have not
awaken yet to see clearly their sins.
In the very beginning, director Bonnie Klein gives us
her reasons for exploring the world of pornography:

"I need
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to understand what is going on behind these doors and how it
affects my own life."

Her way of understanding, however, is

premised on the assumption that pornography is filth that
pleases only the male viewer who always has the privilege of
experiencing voyeuristic pleasure.

The camera's insistence

on showing the satisfied male spectator over and over again
suggests that males are inherently the ones who look.

When

eventually Linda becomes an active spectator as well, she
takes no pleasure in looking.

Linda and the director visit

a live theater/video porn arcade in New York, where Linda
asks the owner to show her something "interesting."

After

he plays the scene for her where a woman is shown in
bondage, she comments!

"That hurts.

lot. That did not turn me on.

That really hurts a

Do you have any films where

they are really making love together, having a good time,
without any heavy power?"

In turn, she is shown another

scene where a woman performs fellatio.
revolted again:

She seems to be

"Look, she is doing it all to him.''

things happen here.

Two

In the first instance, Linda assumes

that pain is universal; i.e. that her pain is also the
portrayed character's pain, and that there is one legitimate
category of materials that turn us on.

She also assumes

that the film could offer her a spectatorial pleasure if the
sexual scene she has just seen involved no power play.
Moreover, she suggests that the film could become "erotic"
if only "he was doing it all to her."

The implications here
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resonate with Dworkin's presumption about the passivity of a
female subject involved in sexual relations.
What follows as an attempt to escape the filth of
pornography is the hugging scene between Linda and Bonnie
Klein:
Bonnie:
Linda:

"Does it make you worry that...about your own
perception of yourself?
" No, no, no. It's starting to get to me on an
emotional level, on the humanity level."

Klein refers here to Linda's own situatedness as the
stripper who started this journey being convinced that she
earns money in a legitimate way.

The purpose of the film's

narration is to awaken Linda from the darkness of false
consciousness and to show her the misery and hopelessness of
her own position.

And the film is undoubtedly successful:

as we watch the unfolding of the narrative structure, Linda
goes through the transformative act of awakening.

It is

Linda's "humanity level," which is being shaken by the
unsettling pornographic imagery, that needs to stay intact.
And it is her "emotional level" which is supposed to strike
our empathy as the ultimate proof about the dangers of
pornography.

One of the final comments of the film is given

by a disembodied female voice: "I think that what we have to
do is to reject the pornographic images of ourselves."

The

concluding implications suggest that we need to embrace our
"humanity level" by leaving out the body in the fuzzy realm
of erotica where it would stay free from power relations and

free from the power of looking.
Although the film glances at S/M relations, S/M
dynamics are neither explained in their specificities nor
are they suggested as one of the many possibilities of
sexual representations.

The anti-porn logic, that clearly

functions as the premise of Not a Love Story, can be further
challenged and complicated when we do think about
controversial S/M relations whose discourse consistently
insists on highlighting the body.

Williams, for example,

suggests that S/M manifestations effectively disrupt the
homogenous construct of sexual representations:
Sadomasochistic scenarios present an even more
difficult problem in the Meese Commission's
assessment of violence in sexual representation,
for here the violence is depicted not as actual
coercion but as a highly ritualized game in which
the participants consent to play predetermined
roles of dominance and submission. Discussion
thus often ignores the fact that in these scenario
women can just as well be— and often are— the
dominators. (18)
Describing the detailed workings of the Meese Commission and
the Women Against Pornography movement, William notes that
the commission's condemnation of violent pornography plays
on the valid concerns about the escalation of violence
against women in the contemporary society at large.
However, the critique of violence rests on the sexual nature
of pornographic materials and fails to identify violence
prevalent in other non-explicitly sexual genres, for
example, in "slasher" films (18):

The commission then contradictorily continues to
indict pornography as if it were the ultimate
harm, thus displacing legitimate concern for
runaway violence and violent sexual crimes onto
the legally vulnerable scapegoat of pornography.
(Williams 18-19)
Furthermore, Williams scrutinizes the commission's rhetoric
based on puritanical moral and ethical values which endorse
"normal" sexuality and condemn any other unconventional or
"dangerous" sexual practices.

Clearly, S/M scenarios fit

right into the category of both perversion and violence
since they do not conform to the prescribed norms of
"proper" sexual behavior.

Because S/M subculture defies

prescribed heterosexual practices, it further undermines and
complicates any homogeneous understanding of pornography.
Williams, for example, who treats pornography as a genre,
suggests that in order to introduce the alternative position
of women's power and pleasure we need to be wary of the
anti-porn arguments which claim that pornography is
incapable of addressing the whole truth of sexuality (22):
Here the implication is that a whole truth of
sexuality actually exists, outside of language,
discourse, and power. This idea, I argue, is the
central fallacy of all the anti-porn feminist
position: that a single, whole sexuality exists
opposed to the supposed deviations and
abnormalities of somebody else's fragmentation.
(23)
Following Williams' line of argumentation, I think that
instead of being fixated on protecting the notion of
"natural" sexuality, a more complex feminist position on
pornography and sexuality must be negotiated.

The anti-porn
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belief that if we could get rid of pornographic materials,
which supposedly cause harm, women would be free from
objectification, victimization, brutality, and rape, needs
to be challenged:

"the idea that pornographic material

causes men's violence tends to excuse the behavior of men
who are sexually coercive and violent, by removing the blame
on to pornography" (Segal 17).

Instead of blaming

pornography for causing violence against women, we can
concentrate on challenging and resisting the misogynistic
culture and its dominant fiction. 5 One of the modes of
resistance may be, for example, "reading" the most
"innocent" cultural materials like mainstream films and
commercials which portray and often also encourage violence
against women.

It is this "innocence" of various cultural

productions which disguises the workings of the
phallocentric logic and its phobic tendencies manifested
through the concepts of heterosexism, gender, and race
purity.

We cannot deny that we are historically placed

within the capitalistic moment where commodification and
objectification happen; but we can, I believe, intervene in
the process of cultural constructedness and find pleasure in
subverting cultural texts by using them in a way they have
never been intended to be used.

Notes

1.

I am referring here to Saussure's discussion of the

arbitrariness of language and his claim that language has
neither ideas nor sounds that exist before the linguistic
system. Saussure suggests here that words cannot reflect a
reality outside language.

This is his controversial claim

that nothing exists prior to the linguistic practice and
that there is no inherent "meaning" in words, only
differences.

His claim that neither the signifier nor the

signified precede the linguistic system suggests that the
"meaning" does not precede language either, and that it does
not occupy a sphere outside language.

Instead, meaning is

produced and negotiated through differences within language.
See Kaja Silverman, The Subject of Semiotics, (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1983).
2.

I am using here Derrida's notion that "meaning" is

not a separate "entity" and that it does not exist outside
the linguistic system, but that instead it is mediated
through "differance" within that system.

Unlike Saussure,

who privileges the signified as a reference point, Derrida
argues that all terms are secondary because they carry
"traces;" i.e. they carry elements of other terms with which
they are interconnected and with which they interact.
fact that the signified is also a signifier for another
signified points to the endlessness of play within the

The
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signifying practice.

The concept of "traces" suggests that

there are no "pure" terms

in and of themselves, but rather

that language rests on the principle of deferral; i.e. on
the idea that signification is produced through a series of
differences and is always temporally deferred.

In other

words, each time we speak or write, the significance or
meaning is "promised" and then deferred so that we can never
"catch," stabilize, or define meaning.

See excerpts from

"Difference" (1968), A Critical and Cultural Theory Reader,
ed. by Anthony Easthope and Kate McGowan.

(Toronto:

University of Toronto Press, 1992), 108-132.
3.

For a further discussion on Annie Sprinkle's

performance art see Linda Williams, "A Provoking Agent:

The

Pornography and Performance Art of Annie Sprinkle" in Dirty
Looks, ed. by Pamela Church Gibson and Roma Gibson.
(London:
4.

British Film Institute, 1993), 176-191.
For further discussion of Not a Love Story see

Linda Williams "Conclusion" in Hard Core, (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1989), 265-279.
5.

I am referring here to Kaja Silverman's discussion

on the dominant fiction.

She complicates the Althusserian

model of ideology and instead uses the term of the dominant
fiction which embraces society's mode of production,
historical issues of gender, class, race, and the Symbolic
Order (language and its institutions).

See Male
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Subjectivity at the Margins, (New York: Routledge Chapman
and Hall, 1992).
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